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In this dissertation, I study the performance impact of information technology (IT) 
investments in the public sector. IT has been one of the key assets in public 
administration since the early MIS era. Even though the information systems (IS) 
discipline has witnessed a considerable amount of research efforts on the subject of IT 
business value for the last couple of decades, the study on IT value in governments has 
not been as extensive as in the for-profit domain. A broad range of literature search in the 
areas of IS, public administration, public economics, and political sciences shows that 
there have been a limited number of quantitative empirical studies on the performance 
impact of IT in public organizations. To fill this gap in the literature, the dissertation 
presents three studies with distinctive theoretical examining the IT value in the public 
sector.  
In the first study, drawing upon the public value management perspective from 
public administration and the literature on IT resources in the IS discipline, I lay a 
theoretical foundation for the mechanism in which IT resources contribute to the 
generation of public value. Specifically, I argue that IT resources create public value by 
facilitating the four key organizational capabilities in governments - operational 
capability, communication capability, partnering capability, and innovative capability.  
In the second study, I empirically measure the cost efficiency effect of IT 
investments in the context of U.S. state governments. Estimation with a stochastic 
xi 
 
frontier estimation approach with the cost function framework shows that there is a 
significant efficiency improvement effect of IT in state governments.  
In the third study, the performance effect of IT is analyzed from the government 
growth perspective. Theories on government growth in political sciences and public 
economics provide theoretical predictions on the influence of IT on government 
expenditures as well as a basis for empirical estimation. I find that IT investments are 
associated with smaller expenditure size in U.S. state governments.  
Overall, this dissertation contributes to the litera u e by offering a theoretical 
framework, empirical methodologies, and conclusive evidence showing the value 




CHAPTER 1.  
GENERAL INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1. Research Background 
  
A vast range of research has been conducted in the information systems (IS) 
discipline for the last couple of decades to find out whether information technologies (IT) 
provide sufficient payoff, be it tangible or intangible, that can justify enormous 
investments in IT in the private sector (Brynjolfsson 1993, Bharadwaj et al. 1999, 
Melville et al. 2004). A large body of studies has provided evidence that IT does 
contribute to considerable performance improvement a d value creation within 
organizations as well as throughout the entire value chain (Barua et al. 1995, Rai et al. 
2005, Banker et al. 2006). However, most studies in the IT value literature, except for 
ones focusing on healthcare organizations (e.g. Devaraj and Kohli 2000, 2003), have 
mainly centered on the for-profit business organization context. 
While several works have studied IT value in the public sector (e.g. Norris and 
Kraemer 1996, Lehr and Lichtenberg 1998, Lee and Perry 2002), the literature has not 
paid as much attention to the performance impact of IT in this sector as in the for-profit 
sector. I consider this an opportunity for new research for the following reasons. First, the 
size of the public sector as well as its influence on the overall economy has continued to 
grow for the last several decades. The ratio of total government spending in the U.S. to 
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gross domestic product (Larkey et al. 1980, North 1985) has grown from approximately 
30% in 1970 to 38% in 20081. 
Second, a vast amount of spending in IT has been made in recent years in this 
sector. In order to show how the public sector organizations invest in IT compared to for-
profit firms, I compare two datasets, as shown in Table 1. For the public sector, the 
NASCIO Compendium of Digital Governments in States published in 2005 provides the 
entire IT budget (in both central IT functions and executive branches) in 20 U.S. states in 
the fiscal year 2004. For the private sector, InformationWeek 500 survey in 2005 collects 
IT budgets per sales in 337 large U.S. firms. Table 1 suggests that IT spending accounts 
for as significant a portion of expenditures in thepublic sector organizations as in for-
profit firms within the same order of magnitude. 
 
Table 1. Comparison of Private and Public Sector IT Investments 





Annual IT expenditures 
(thousands $) 
337,351 373,339 (3) 
IT expenditures per 
employee ($) 
6,793.93 14,738.35 (4) 
IT expenditures per revenue 
(%) 
5.00 (2) 3.66 (5) 




The trend that information technologies have become a strategic resource in 
governments takes place not just in the U.S. but around the world. Delivery of public 
services via IT and the Internet has been a prevalent phenomenon in European nations. 
eGovernment Benchmark Survey published by the European Commission evaluates the 
                                                
1 http://www.usgovernmentspending.com/charts.html  
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level of online availability of core 20 public services2 in 27 member states (European 
Commission 2010). According to the survey, the online availability3 of the core 20 
services has increased from 20% to 75% from 2001 to 2009. 
This is the case in the developing countries as well. The Global E-Government 
Surveys conducted by United Nations Department of Ec nomics and Social Affairs have 
reported e-Government Indexes for the entire member counties since 2003. The e-
Government Index evaluates the application of IT in governments for better access and 
delivery of services to citizens and enhanced interactions with citizens and business 
(United Nations 2010)4. Figure 1 illustrates that there is an upward trend from 2003 to 
2008 in e-Government Index across the continents outside of North American and Europe, 
while the indexes in North America and Europe relatively stagnate for the same time 
period. This illustrates governments in the developing nations are increasingly 
recognizing the strategic importance of IT in improving government administration and 
delivery of public services. 
 A wide range of anecdotal evidence demonstrates that IT in governments creates 
value to the public in many aspects, in both develop d and developing countries. 
Minnesota's Program Integrity Network (PIN) is a case in point (NASCIO 2006). The 
State of Minnesota introduced a business intelligence and data warehouse system to its 
Family Investment Program, a $55 million-a-year public assistant program. PIN's 
analytic capability enables program administrators  easily discover fraudulent cases of 
                                                
2 The core 20 public services include social security benefits, income tax filing, and customs declaration 
and encompass those for both individual services and businesses. 
3 The survey measures online availability by the extent to which a user can access to information on a 
specific public service and execute a full transaction on an online basis. 
4 It consists of evaluation for government Web sites, lecommunication infrastructures, human capital, and 
participation of citizens via online channels. 
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welfare provision, detecting $12.2 million of wrongful benefit provision in 2006. 
According to the state, it also leads to a substantial amount of labor cost savings in 
benefit investigations. 
 
Figure 1. The UN Global E-Government Index Excluding North America and 
Europe 
 
Source: United Nations Global E-Government Surveys, 2003-2010 
(http://www.unpan.org/egovkb/global_reports/08report.htm) 
 
e-Government initiatives in developing countries provide the underprivileged with 
a variety of means and opportunities to economic pros erity. For instance, the State of 
Karnataka, India launched a project name “Bhoomi” in 2004, which computerizes about 
20 million records of land ownership of 6.7 million farmers (Monga 2008). This system 
automates the maintenance of land ownership records, cropping patterns, and other 
agriculture-related information and the processes of transaction and approval of land 
transfer and registration, which had been conducted manually by state officials and used 
to be as lengthy as several months or years. The introduction of Bhoomi system resulted 
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in a wide range of values to the state and farmers including not only saves in costs and 
time of farmers and increased revenues to the statebut also enhanced accuracy in land 
records. More importantly, the system creates value in transparency and accountability by 
eliminating corruption riddled in record management, i  which before Bhoomi system, 
farmers had been required to pay bribes for faster processes. 
Given the increasing important of IT in public administration and the massive 
amount of spending in IT in governments at all leves, it is imperative to understand 
whether and how IT contributes to the performance of public administration and value 
creation to the public. However, as the literature search in the next subsection reveals, 
there is a lack of empirical studies in the IS field as well as the public administration, 
economics and political sciences discipline. Thus, this dissertation aims at providing a 
theoretical ground and quantitative empirical evidence for the impact of IT on 
organizational performance and value creation in the public sector.  
It should be noted that there are several crucial differences between the private 
and the profit sector. First and fundamentally, there is absence of profit motives and 
competitive pressures in the government area. Thus, by definition, profitability is not an 
objective, and neither are increasing revenues necessarily a desired outcome. In addition, 
productivity metrics in the for-profit sector are usually based on a notion of value-added 
that is closely linked to profitability outcomes, which may not directly apply in the public 
sector. Second, while for-profit organizations pursue a few performance goals such as 
profitability, market share, or growth, public organizations usually seek to achieve a 
much broader range of objectives, as stressed by the institutional perspective of public 
value management (Section 2.3.3). For instance, Bailey (2004, p. 27) states that public 
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organizations aim at accomplishing the greater 4Es – equity, efficiency, economy, and 
effectiveness. U.S. state governments are required by federal and state laws to fulfill 
multiple objectives such as providing quality public education, facilitating economic 
development, and offering a safety net for the underprivileged. In many occasions, 
pursuing one goal comes with sacrificing another (Downs and Larkey 1986, p. 3). Not 
only does it take multiple years for governments to achieve objectives for public interests, 
but it is by no means straightforward to quantify the fulfillment of such goals in a reliable 
manner. Last, as governments intend to accomplish a range of goals, decision makings in 
the public sector usually involve a far more diversity of stakeholders including politicians, 
businesses, not-for-profit organizations, and ordinary citizens. These differences beg the 
following questions. (i) Is the mechanism in which IT creates value in the public sector 
different from the business sector? (ii) Are the thories and the methodologies for the 
private sector IT value studies appropriate and adequat  for the public sector context 
study? This dissertation delves into answering these questions. 
 
1.2. Literature Search on IT in Governments 
  
In order to examine the status quo of IT value research in the public sector, I 
conducted a comprehensive literature search for refe e d journal articles in a broad range 
of fields. Academic disciplines in consideration span from information systems to 
economics, public administration, and political sciences.  
Broadly, I intend to understand where research interes s in government IT center 
around. Thus, I searched research articles that deal with IT artifacts within governments. 
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Thus, research topics include not only IT value butalso IT adoption and use, IT 
management and development, and IT-driven collaboration and decision making. In 
selecting articles, I excluded studies with a nominal view of technology (Orlikowski and 
Iacono 2001), which do not directly consider IT artif cts within governments. Such 
studies include government policies in technology industries, R&D, copyrights, or 
computer securities (e.g. Chen and Png 2003, Gal-Or nd Ghose 2005). I do not consider 
such topics as my primary interest is the performance effect of IT within governments. 
First, in the Information System field, I scanned articles in leading IS journals 
including Management Science, MIS Quarterly, and Information Systems published from 
Jan. 1990 to Jun. 2010. I searched titles, abstract, nd keywords that contain any of the 
following terms – government, public organization, public sector, or public employee. 
The initial search yielded only 11 articles. Thus, I decided to expand the scope of the 
literature search to the top 10 IS journals identified by Lowry et al. (2004) and Rainer and 
Miller (2005). The list of journals is available inAppendix 1.1. I excluded journals 
targeted for practitioners such as Harvard Business Review or Sloan Management Review. 























































MIS Quarterly 1  6 1  8 
Information Systems Research  1  2   3 
Journal of Management Information Systems 
(JMIS) 1 1 4 1 1 8 
Decision Support Systems (DSS) 3 3 5  3 14 
Information & Management 7  11   18 
IS Journals Total 13 4 28 2 4 51 
Non-IS Journals 
Journal of Public Administration Research and 
Theory (J-PART) 1  9 2 1 13 
Public Administration Review (PAR) 2  24 6 1 33 
Governance    3  3 
American Review of Public Administration 5  9   14 
Public Administration   2 1 2 5 
Journal of Industrial Economics (JIE)   1   1 
Non-IS Journals Total 8  45 12 4 69 
Total 21 4 73 14 8 120 
 
In order to search papers in the Economics field, I referred to Thomson-Reuter 
Journal Citation Report (JCR) 2009 Social Science Edition. I chose top 10 journals in 
economics category in terms of the 5-year impact factor. The journal chosen is also listed 
in Appendix 1.1. In addition to these top 10 journals, I also included public economics 
and industrial organization journals within top 100 economics journals5. Papers were 
searched with the keywords of computer, digital, information technology, information 
                                                
5 Rand Journal of Economics (Rank 39), Journal of Public Economic (Rank 44), Journal of Urban 
Economics (Rank 55), Journal of Industrial Economics (Rank 63), International Journal of Industrial 
Economics (Rank 83), Journal of Economics & Management Strategy (Rank 85) 
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system, e-government in the period of Jan. 1990 to Jun. 2010. Only articles that focus on 
the public sector IT were chosen. I also referred to JCR 2009 Social Science Edition to 
select journals in public administration and political sciences. For each discipline, I select 
top 10 journals, as listed in Appendix 1.1. The same timeframe and the same set of 
keywords were employed. In total, 69 articles were found in the non-IS journals (Table 2). 
I find that the leading journals in IS, economics, public administration, and 
political sciences have published 120 papers in total that focus on IT and governments 
since 1990. Next, carefully reading abstracts and introductions, I categorized these papers 
using the classification of Sidorava et al. (2008), as shown in Table 2. The majority of 
studies are at the organizational-level (73 papers) with the issues of organizational IT 
adoption and use, IT value, and information systems (IS) management. Studies on IT and 
individuals are popular as well, focusing on indiviual-level IT adoption and use, human 
resources (HR) issues, or decision support systems. Given that IT and markets are 
concerned with how IT use affects interorganizational relationships and markets 
(Sidorava et al. 2008), I classified such topics as the effect of IT on democracy, political 
processes, and government-citizen interactions as IT nd markets.  
Among the organizational-level studies, I selected IT value studies based on the 
definition of Kohli and Grover (2008). They define that an IT value study has to have two 
components – (i) IT variable, IT management variable or manifestation, and (ii) 
endogenous variable with IT economic impact. With this criterion, I discovered seven 
articles that are qualified for IT value research. Two are from IS journals (Mukhopadhyay 
et al. 1997, DSS, and Teo et al. 1997, JMIS), while the rest five are published in non-IS 
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journals (Norris and Kraemer 1996, PAR, Lehr and Lichtenberg 1998, JIE, Nunn 2001, 
PAR, Lee and Perry 2002, J-PART,  and Norris and Moon 2005, PAR). 
Based on the production-function framework, Lehr and Lichtenberg (1998) 
discover the productivity improvement effect of IT assets in U.S. federal agencies. Also 
with the production-function framework, Lee and Perry (2002) find a positive impact of 
IT assets in U.S. state governments on state gross domestic product (GDP). 
Mukhopadhyay et al. (1997) discover an efficiency improvement in the toll collection 
process after the adoption of a new IT application in Pennsylvania Turnpike. Their study, 
however, considers their setting (the Pennsylvania Turnpike) as a context for finding the 
process-level effect and does not explicitly aim at examining the performance impact of 
IT in public organizations, unlike Lehr and Lichtenberg (1998) and Lee and Perry (2002). 
In four of the seven studies, however, the impact of IT is only part of their 
research scope. For example, in a case study of Singapore Trade Development Board, 
Teo et al. (1997) report that the new EDI system, which interconnects traders with 
various government agencies related to trading and custom, significantly improved the 
effectiveness of trading declaration processes and the satisfactions of traders. Their study 
also covers changes in organizational structures and processes, and the performance 
improvement is not their main focus6. 
In sum, the literature search reveals that there are a limited set of studies for IT in 
governments that are published in mainstream research journals. Kraemer and Dedrick 
(1997) called for more research efforts in IT in the public sector, but I find that their 
proposal has not been embraced enthusiastically. Even though the articles I found may 
                                                
6 Other three papers that are not mentioned here are Norris and Kraemer (1996), Nuun (2001), and Norris 
and Moon (2005),  
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not be exhaustive, I believe that the list of studies adequately represents major interests in 
government IT within the core IS and public administration disciplines. More 
significantly, I discover a dearth of studies in IT and organizational performance in the 
public sector, compared to other research topics in IT for the public sector and a 
cornucopia of IT value articles for the private sector (Melville et al. 2004). Moreover, 
among the seven IT value studies in the public sector, only three exclusively focus on the 
performance effect of IT, while such an effect is part of the scope in the rest of the studies. 
Therefore, the literature search illustrates an urgent need for more understanding of the 
relationship between IT and organizational performance within governments. 
 
1.3. Summaries of the Chapters 
 
 In order to fill the gap in the prior literature discovered by the literature search, 
the present dissertation presents three studies with dis inctive theoretical perspectives on 
IT value in governments – public value management perspective from public 
management, cost efficiency perspective from public economics, and government growth 
perspective from political sciences. Each chapter makes a unique contribution to the IS as 
well as the respective reference literature. This subsection summarizes the subsequent 
chapters. 
In Chapter 2 entitled “IT Resources, Organizational Capabilities, and Value 
Creation in Public Organizations – Public Value Management Perspective,” I lay a 
theoretical ground on the mechanism in which IT resources contribute to the generation 
of public value. Specifically, this chapter aims to identify the processes through which IT 
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resources in public organizations contribute to value creation. I follow a process-level 
approach, suggesting that as in for-profit firms, the relationship between IT resources and 
organizational performance in governments is mediat by organizational capabilities 
(Barua et al. 1995, Ray et al. 2005, Rai et al. 2006, Banker et al. 2006). I develop a 
theoretical model that delineates the paths from IT resources to organizational 
performance in governments, drawing upon public value management theory (Moore 
1995, Kelley et al. 2002, Stoker 2006, Alford and Hughes 2007). This perspective asserts 
that public managers, on behalf of the public, should strive to generate greater public 
value, as managers in the private sector seek to achieve greater private value, which in 
most cases represents monetary returns to shareholders. Based on the review of public 
value management literature, I suggest the four key organizational capabilities that may 
reside in the linkage between IT resources and public value – operational capability, 
communication capability, partnering capability, and i novative capability. I argue that 
IT resources in public organizations enable public managers to pursue greater public 
value by cultivating these four organizational capabilities. 
 In Chapter 3 entitled “Information Technology and A ministrative Efficiency in 
U.S. State Governments – A Stochastic Frontier Approach,” I investigate whether IT 
investments in state governments lead to greater cost-efficiency, which refers to the 
extent to which a government provides public goods and services with limited resources 
(Downs and Larkey 1986, p. 6, Stiglitz 2000, p. 149). I argue that the conventional 
approaches to measuring the performance impact of IT investments in for-profit firms, 
which directly relates performance measures to IT investment measures, are unsuitable in 
the government context for the following reasons. First, it is difficult to find an 
13  
 
appropriate measure to gauge the collective amount f outputs that state governments 
produce. While in the for-profit context, such measure  as sales or value-added can 
account for aggregate outputs that a firm supplies, any single measure can hardly 
represent a variety of public services such as education, transportation, and so forth. 
Second, in the government context, it is more reason ble to assume that the amount of 
public service outputs are exogenously given, in cotrast to the production function 
framework in which the amount of output is considered to be endogenous (Brynjolfsson 
and Hitt 1996, Dewan and Kraemer 2000, Bresnahan et al. 2002). In this regard, I 
propose a translog cost function model with stochastic frontier estimation (Caves et al. 
1980, Aigner et al. 1977) as a new empirical methodology for IT value studies in the 
public sector. Utilizing the IT budget data in state governments, the census data on state 
government expenditures, and a variety of information on public services states provide, I 
estimate technical cost efficiency, a proxy for administrative efficiency. The empirical 
analyses provide evidence for a significantly positive relationship between IT intensity 
and cost efficiency. The results indicate that all others being equal, on average, a $1 
increase in per capita IT budget can lead to $4.18 efficiency gains. I also find that the 
relationship between IT intensity and cost efficieny is contingent upon several factors 
such as state gross domestic product (GDP), the size of state IT organizations, and the 
centrality of IT management. 
In Chapter 4 entitled “Do Information Technology Investments Lead to Bigger or 
Smaller Governments? – Theory and Evidence in U.S. State Governments,” I study a 
long-standing research question among public economists and political scientists and a 
concern for the general public – government growth (Larkey et al. 1981, Lybeck 1988, 
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Tarschys 1975, North 1985). I investigate the impact of IT investments on government 
growth. While the prior IS studies have investigate th  relationship between IT and 
organizational sizes in the for-profit context (Brynjolfsson et al. 1994, Hitt 1999, Wood et 
al. 2008), there has been a few studies at the organizational-level studies and also in the 
context of governments. Drawing on the literature on public economics, political sciences, 
and IT value (Fiorina and Noll 1978, Becker 1983, Banks 1989), I offer theoretical 
discussions and four mechanisms as to the relationship between IT investments and 
government expenditures, leading to two competing hypotheses that IT investments 
either expand or shrink the amount of government expenditures. Adopting the state 
government growth model of Garand (1988, 1989), I test which prediction prevails in the 
context of U.S. state governments. The empirical investigations support the hypothesis 
that greater IT investments are associated with smaller state government size, measured 
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CHAPTER 2.  
IT  RESOURCES, ORGANIZATIONAL CAPABILITIES , AND VALUE CREATION 




It has been one of the primary research focuses in information systems (IS) 
literature for the last couple of decades to find whether information technology (IT) 
investments can lead an organization to generate greater value and achieve sustainable 
competitive advantages (Brynjolfsson 1993, Melville et al. 2004). To provide an answer 
to such a question, numerous IS researchers have pres nted a broad range of empirical 
evidence showing that information technology investments are positively associated with 
firm performance in terms of productivity, profitability, and market value (Hitt and 
Brynjolfsson 1996, Brynjolfsson and Hitt 1996, Bharadwaj et al. 1999, Kohli and Devaraj 
2003, Anderson et al. 2006). A subsequent question raised by both scholars and 
practitioners is how investments in IT lead to greater organizational performance. This 
question leads IS researchers to shift their attention from the direct impact of IT on firm 
performance to under which mechanism IT contribute to firm performance (Piccoli and 
Ives 2005). In other words, they take an opening-the-black-box approach (Barua et al. 
1995, Ray et al. 2005). 
Unlike many firm-level studies which examine the association between IT 
resources and firm performance, a number of relatively recent studies take a process-level 
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approach. This approach argues that IT resources, which consist of IT assets and 
capabilities (Wade and Hilland 2004), do not directly lead to greater organizational 
performance, but they do so through intermediate organizational processes such as 
manufacturing, marketing, customer service, and supply chain management (Barua et al. 
1995, Ray et al. 2005, Rai et al. 2006, Banker et al. 2006). It also contends that mere 
existence of hardware, software, or other technology assets does not necessarily 
contribute to higher firm performance. The effective use, management, and leverage of 
IT resources by managers in developing actual organizational processes and capabilities 
can lead to value creation (Pavlou and El Sawy 2006). 
Based on this process-level approach, the present study aims to identify through 
which process IT resources in public organizations contribute to value creation. I hereby 
suggest that as in for-profit firms, the relationship between IT resources and 
organizational performance in governments is mediat by organizational capabilities 
(Figure 2). In other words, effective use and deployment of IT resources foster 
organizational capabilities, which in turn create gr ater value for organizations and the 
public. 
 












In contrast to some studies that draw on economics theories (Brynjolfsson and 
Hitt 1996, Barua and Lee 1997, Melville et al. 2007), several studies adopt resource-
based view (RBV) (Wade and Hulland 2004) or dynamic capability theory (Teece et al. 
1997, Pavlou and El Sawy 2006) from strategic management literature as a theoretical 
background to find out which IT resources and organizational capabilities help firms 
achieve long-term competitive advantages. For instance, a major thrust of RBV is that 
differences in firm performance originates from heterogeneous resources possessed by 
firms rather from their strategic positioning in industries, and those that own resources 
that are value, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable can attain sustained value creation 
(Barney 1991). IS scholars have maintained that some IS resources, such as the ability to 
manage IS-business relationship, have such four attributes and thus contribute to firms’ 
competitive advantages (Melville et al. 2004, Wade nd Hulland 2004). They also argue 
that IT resources contribute to greater firm performance by helping develop 
organizational resources that have value, rarity, non-i imitability, and non-substitutability 
characteristics. 
Here, drawing upon public value management theory, I develop a theoretical 
model that delineates the paths from IT resources to organizational performance in the 
public sector organizations. Public value management theory asserts that public managers, 
on behalf of the public, should strive to generate greater public value, as managers in the 
private sector, entrusted by shareholders, seek to achieve greater private value, which in 
most cases represents monetary returns to shareholders (Moore 1995). Thus, in the 
public-sector context, organizational performance is gauged by how the organization 
creates public value for the citizens it serves (Alford and O’Flynn 2009, Moore and 
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Benington 2011). My review of public value management literature, which is presented 
in detail in Section 2.3, suggests the four key organizational capabilities that are 
paramount to public value creation – operational capability, communication capability, 
partnering capability, and innovative capability (Moore 1995, Stoker 2006, Alford and 
Hughes 2008, Alford and O'Flynn 2009). Subsequently, in Section 2.4, I explain the 
linkages between IT resources, the four organization l capabilities, and public value. I 
argue that IT resources in public organizations enable public managers to pursue greater 
public value by cultivating these four organizational capabilities, as described in Figure 3. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section reviews 
the previous literature on IT resources and organizational capabilities in the private sector. 
Section 2.3 summarizes the literature on public value management literature and 
compares it to prior public management paradigms (traditional public management and 
new public management). Section 2.4 provides a detailed discussion of the relationship 
between IT resources, organizational capabilities, and public value creation. Section 2.5 
concludes the discussion. 
 
Figure 3. The Theoretical Framework  
IT Resources














2.2. IT Resources, Organizational Capabilities, and Organizational Performance 
 
There are varying definitions and categorizations in the IS literature concerning 
organizational IT assets, resources, and capabilities (e.g. Ross et al. 1996, Feeny and 
Willcocks 1998). Among them, I rely on the definition proposed by Wade and Hulland 
(2004), who define IT resources as IT assets and IT capabilities. IT assets refer to 
anything tangible or intangible related to IT that c n be used in organizational processes 
for creating, producing, and offering products and services. IT assets may include 
hardware, software, network infrastructure, or human resources in IT functions. IT 
capabilities refer to repeatable patterns of actions n the use of IT assets. In a similar vein, 
Bharadwaj (2000) define IT capability as a firm’s “ability to mobilize and deploy IT-
based resources in combination or copresent with other resources and capabilities” (p. 
171). Pavlou and El Sawy (2006) explain that IT capabilities have three key dimensions – 
the acquisition of IT assets, deployment of IT assets through tight IT-business 
relationships, and leveraging of IT assets in formulating business strategies. 
The literature on IT resources consistently emphasizes that not all IT resources 
matter to business value creation. Some IT resources such as IT infrastructure and 
technical skills can be relatively easily acquired from the market, imitated by competitors, 
and substitutable with similar resources. Hence, such capabilities are rarely considered a 
source of business success (Wade and Hulland 2004). Only IT resources that are 
inimitable, non-substitutable, and imperfectly immobile can be a lever for competitive 
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advantages. Such IT resources may include IT management skills or the alignment of IT 
and business processes. 
The literature on IT resources has two related, but dis inctive views on the 
relationship between IT resources, organizational capabilities, and performance – the 
complementarity view and the process view (Table 4). In the first view, IT assets and 
capabilities contribute to organizational performance in conjunction with other 
organizational capabilities. A major argument of this perspective is that IT assets and 
capabilities are complement to organizational processes such as human resource 
management and customer service. To put it differently, when accompanying with 
development in organizational capabilities, IT resources are associated with firm 
performance to a greater extent. For example, Bresnahan et al. (2002) demonstrate that IT 
assets lead a firm to achieve a greater level of prductivity when it has a more 
decentralized workplace organization and a higher level of employees’ skills. Bharadwaj 
et al. (2007) demonstrate that integrated IS capability, which is defined as the degree to 
which a firm’s information systems provide integrated data and process integration, 
moderates the impact of coordination capabilities in manufacturing, marketing, and 
supply chain on manufacturing performance. 
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Complementarity View 1) 
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Galal (1998) 
IT Investments Workforce Composition Productivity 
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1) Organizational capabilities moderate the relationship between IT and organizational performance.  
2) Organizational capabilities mediate the relationship between IT and performance (Figure 2). 
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The second perspective – the process view – stresses that IT resources are 
associated with organizational performance indirectly via organizational capabilities. 
Barua et al. (1995) and Mukhopadhyay et al. (1997) are two of the early studies that 
develop this view. The major thrust of this view is that IT resources facilitate the 
development of superior organizational capabilities such as ones in marketing, operation, 
or supply chain management. These capabilities in turn positively affect firm 
performance and become a source of sustained competitive advantages, as illustrated in 
Figure 2.  Ray et al. (2005) argue that a process lvel of analysis (as opposed to a firm 
level) is the most appropriate level of observing the strategic effects of IT (Pavlou and El 
Sawy 2006). 
Among many studies with this view, Rai et al. (2006) show that IT infrastructure 
integration with suppliers and customers drives supply chain integration (organizational 
capability), which subsequently contributes to greater firm performance with respect to 
operational excellence, customer relationships, and revenue growth. Banker et al. (2006) 
find that the adoption of plant information systems such as resource planning systems 
(RPS), and electronic data interchange (EDI) applications contribute to firm performance 
by improving manufacturing capabilities in terms of just-in-time manufacturing and 
customer/supplier participation programs. In the e-business context, Barua et al. (2004) 
show that system integration within a firm accelerat s online information exchange with 
suppliers and customers and increases the level of digitization of day-to-day business 
transactions with them. These organizational capabilities – online information exchange 
and digitized business transactions – lead to greate  financial performance. Lastly, in a 
multi-business context, Tanriverdi (2005, 2006) finds that IT relatedness across business 
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units, which refers to a shared, standardized IT infrastructure or IT management process, 
increases firm performance directly (Tanriverdi 2006) as well as indirectly via improved 
cross-unit knowledge management capability (Tanriverdi 2005). My theoretical model 
follows this process-view perspective, as explained i  the subsequent sections. 
 
2.3. Public Value Management Perspective  
 
2.3.1. What is Public Value Management? 
In explaining the value creation mechanism of IT in the public sector 
organizations, I adopt the public value management p rspective as a theoretical basis. 
The basic tenet underlying this perspective is that public officials should strive to 
maximize public value, just as do managers in for-pr fit firms seek to maximize private 
value (Moore 1995). Here, public value broadly refes to the value created by 
government through services, laws, regulation, and other actions (Kelley et al. 2002). 
Researchers in this stream emphasize that rather than passively following the dictates of 
politicians and elected officials and meeting the given responsibilities of public service 
provisions, public managers need to play an active role in exploring new opportunities in 
public value creation, engaging in continuous dialogues with various stakeholders 
including politicians and citizens, and improving capabilities in public service delivery. 
In other words, to generate more public value, a public manager needs to become not a 
simple technician or a passive producer, but an entrepreneur with a clear strategic mission 




Entrepreneurship is promoted in this literature, because like for-profit firms, 
governments are subject to increasingly dynamic and uncertain environments (Moore and 
Khagram 2004, Swilling 2011). Social and political circumstances surrounding 
governments continue to evolve, technological advances change and even sometimes 
disrupt business and society at large, and new risks and threats to citizens such as 
terrorisms, outbreaks of pandemic diseases, or global warming keep emerging. Therefore, 
citizens’ needs, goals and expectation for governments are by no means constant. The 
public value literature, however, argues that existing democratic and political processes 
and public management systems, which value continuity and preservation of the status 
quo, are inadequate to deal with such a dynamic environment. It emphasizes that public 
managers, who may have extensive expertise and knowledge in policy making and public 
service delivery, need to play a more proactive rolin sensing changing environments, in 
responding to new needs for legitimate government intervention, and in innovating public 
management for securing public value. 
 
2.3.2. Comparison to Previous Public Management Models 
 The public value management perspective has recently merged as an alternative 
management model to two public management paradigms that have dominated for 
several decades – traditional public management and new public management. Kelly et al. 
(2002), Stoker (2006), and O’Flynn (2007) provide excellent comparisons of the three 
models.  
Traditional or progressive public management (PPM, Hood 1994, Dunleavy et al. 
2006) can be characterized by bureaucracy, hierarchy, and standardization. In this model, 
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public service provision is managed by bureaucratic government agencies that are 
equipped with a clearly defined division of labor, a rule-oriented administration, a full-
time career structure of public officials with continuity and long-term advancement, and 
extensive expertise and knowledge in public service arena (Lane 2000, Stoker 2006).  
New public management (NPM) gained popularity in the early 1980s in response 
to inherent inflexibility, inefficiency, and lack of response in bureaucratic public 
organizations (Alford and Hughes 2008). Rooted in the theory of bureaucracy, principal-
agent theory, and transaction cost economics (O’Flynn 2007), NPM aims at instilling 
market mechanisms and business doctrines into public organizations, i.e. “running 
governments like corporations.” Hence, in NPM, strict performance contract and 
management, pursuit to cost efficiency, and improvement in customer satisfaction are 
promoted. The privatization of public service production is advocated as a mechanism for 
public sector reform, and Lane (2000) even states that “under an NPM regime, 
government manages the public sector by means of a et of contracts” (p. 10). 
Again, the appearance of public value management has been a response to 
criticisms of NPM. Such criticisms include deterioration in public service quality (Kelley 
et al. 2002), increased transaction costs (O’Flynn 2007), exacerbated organizational 
complexity (Dunleavy et al. 2006), and erosion of accountability and responsibility 
(O’Flynn 2007). Critics of NPM maintain that excessive emphasis on such values as 
efficiency and cost control undermines other fundamental values in public management 
such as fairness, justice, representation, and participation (deLeon and Denhardt 2000, 
Wu and He 2009). Hence, they argue that “a government is not a corporation” and should 
be managed in a different way, i.e. in a way to increase the collective value of the public. 
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For example, in NPM, private production of public services is considered one of the best 
ways to improve the effectiveness of public service off rings; whereas in public value 
management perspective, the choice of public or private delivery of services is guided by 
which venue is best suited for public value creation (Bozeman 2002, O’Flynn 2007, 
Alford and Hughes 2008). 
It should be noted, however, that public value management is not free from 
criticisms, as summarized and addressed by Alford and O’Flynn (2009). Major criticisms 
include the vagueness in what public value means, the confusion as to whether the theory 
is empirical or normative, and the inappropriate emphasis on political roles of public 
managers. As the theory is still emerging and developing, consensus in the meaning of 
public value is yet to be come. Alford and O’Flynn (2009) clarify that public value theory 
is both an empirical theory and a normative prescription. It intends to explain what public 
managers actually do and to stipulate what they should do. Lastly, according to Alford 
and O’Flynn (2009), the prescription that public officials need to be active in political 
arena bothers some scholars that consider the clear distinction between politics and public 
administration to be sacred. However, Moore (1995) and Alford and O’Flynn (2009) 
defend that politicians are the final arbiter in marshaling policy development and 
formulating public service delivery, and the role of public managers should not go 





2.3.3. Two Research Strands in Public Value Management 
 According to the review by Davis and West (2009), there are two major research 
strands in the public value management literature. In the institutional perspective, 
researchers seek to find out what public value is, how it is defined, and what constitutes 
public value. In the generative perspective, scholars discuss and propose normative 
frameworks for appropriate behaviors of public managers who would like to secure 
greater public value. 
 The literature in the institutional perspective consistently highlights that public 
value is far more multi-faceted than private value, which in the business context usually 
refers to monetary profits. Public value not only includes direct benefits from public 
services such as education or public welfare that accrue to individual clients (Alford 
2002), but also comprises goals or aspirations suchas trust to governments, fairness, or 
national prides that are valued collectively by the public (Moore 1995, Alford and 
Hughes 2008, Alford and O’Flynn 2009). While for-profit firms may pursue multiple 
objectives such as sustainability, customer satisfaction, or safety, these objectives usually 
boil down to the ultimate goal in sustaining economic value creation to shareholders. In 
this vein, Davis and West (2009) argue that “the public interest cannot be reduced to 
singular, economic measures. The values that inhere in the public realm in both 
government processes and outputs are irreducibly plural” (p. 604).  
Thus, in the institutional perspective, several studies examine what constitutes 
public value. For example, Beck Jørgensen and Bozeman (2007) attempt to construct a 
constellation of public values that classifies 72 value concepts identified by their review 
of public administration literature. This includes not only productivity and effectiveness 
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in public administration but also broader goals concer ed with the relationship between 
governments and society such as sustainability, responsiveness, or accountability. Kelley 
et al. (2002) argue that public values consist of three components – objective outcomes of 
public services, service qualities perceived by citizens, and trust in governments. 
Cresswell et al. (2006) enumerate six categories of public values – financial, political, 
social, strategic, ideological, and stewardship values. Benington (2009) categorizes 
public value as ecological value, political value, economic value, and social and cultural 
value. In an effect to clarify the meaning of public value, Alford and OF’lynn (2009) 
explain its difference with “public goods” or “public interest.” They argue that public 
value has greater meaning than public goods, which indicate outputs that public 
organizations produce. Public value also encompasses outcomes, which refer to the 
impacts of outputs on those who consume the outputs. Simply put, if outputs are not 
valuable to the citizens who, unlike those in the private sector, sometimes are compelled 
to consume them, public value creation is limited. 
It should be noted, however, that there is no absolute, universally applicable 
standard of public value (Alford and Hughes 2008, Alford and O’Flynn 2009). What is 
publicly valued depends on the needs and desires of the public as well as on social and 
environmental circumstances with which the public and public managers deal. From this 
institutional perspective, Stoker (2006) states that “public value is more than a 
summation of the individual preferences of the users or producers of public services. The 
judgment of public value is collectively built through deliberation involving elected and 
appointed government officials and key stakeholders” (p. 42). This literature stresses that 
two components are essential for true public values to be uncovered – democratic 
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processes and active roles of public managers. Alford and Hughes (2008) state that the 
mechanism on which public managers rely for ascertaining what citizens want is the 
democratic political process. Kelley et al. (2002) argue that value is determined by 
citizens’ preferences, which are expressed through a variety of means and reflected 
through the decisions of elected politicians.  
This argument leads to the generative perspective. This literature points out that in 
increasingly unstable environments, public managers need to play a key role in 
discovering the desire of the public in devising public service offerings. In contrast to the 
traditional or new public management models, which draw a clear boundary between 
politics and public management that public managers are discouraged from crossing, 
public value management stresses that government officials need to consciously engage 
in political discussions and actively participate in discourses with politicians, citizens, 
not-for-profit organizations and businesses to discover how to advance public value (Hui 
and Hayllar 2010). Against this backdrop, the generative perspective attempts to provide 
prescriptions or guidelines for public managers. In a seminal work, Moore (1995) 
suggests that public managers can create greater public value by: (1) increasing the 
quantity or quality of public activities per resource expended; (2) reducing costs (in terms 
of money and authority) used to achieve current levels of production; (3) making public 
organizations better able to identify and respond to ci izens’ aspirations; (4) enhancing 
the fairness with which public sector organization perate; and (5) increasing their 
continuing capacity to respond innovate. Stoker (2006) lists four propositions for the 
pursuit of public values. First, he argues that government intervention is justified only 
when public values are delivered. Second, he asserts tha  the legitimacy of a wide range 
36  
 
of stakeholders needs to be recognized. Third, an ope -minded, relationship approach to 
service delivery is necessary. Lastly, public managers need to equip with an adaptable 
and learning-based approach to the challenge of public service delivery. Smith (2004) 
states that “public officials must engage political authority, collaborate with each other 
within and across institutional boundaries, manage efficiently and effectively, and engage 
with communities and users of services, and reflectiv ly develop their own sense of 
vocation and public duty” (p. 69-70). The second, third, and fourth requirements 
correspond to the partnering, operational, and communication capabilities, respectively, 
which are discussed in the following section. 
 
2.3.4. Comparison to Resource-Based View 
 Before concluding the review of public value management literature, I compare 
the literature with the resource-based view (RBV) in the strategic management, which 
has been a theoretical basis in numerous studies on IT business value and strategic IT 
management (Sambamurthy et al. 2003, Wade and Hulland 2004, Melville et al. 2004). 
The public value management has much in common with RBV. Particularly, both RBV 
and public value management emphasize the importance of organizational capabilities in 
value creation, even though the two theories consider the different realms of 
organizations. Table 5 provides a comparison between public value management and 
RBV. 
 Emerged as an alternative theoretical framework to competitive forces theory 
(Porter 1985), in which competitive advantages are shaped largely by positioning in a 
competitive industry (the logic of positioning as described by Sambamurthy et al. 2003), 
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RBV stresses that variance in organizational performance can be explained by 
heterogeneity in resources held by organizations. Thus, firms that are equipped with 
superior resources and capabilities can achieve suprnormal organizational performance 
(as in the logic of leverage in Sambamurthy et al. 2003). Likewise, as explained above, 
public value management maintains that value creation by public organizations depends 
upon the extent to which public managers and organizations foster internal organizational 
capabilities.  
A key difference between the two perspectives, however, is that while the public 
value literature explains which organizational capability is necessary for public value 
generation, RBV discusses which attribute of organizational capability is important for 
sustained value creation and competitive advantages. In public value management, for 
example, such capabilities as operational capability or communication capability matter. 
In RBV, most representatively, Barney (1991) suggests the four key characteristics of 
organizational resources that contribute to competitiv  advantages – value, rarity, 
inimitability, imperfect mobility. A number of other studies in RBV propose alternative 
attributes (e.g. Dierickx and Cool 1989, Amit and Schoemaker 1993). Public value 
management, on the other hand, does not explicitly explain the necessary characteristics 
of organizational capabilities for value creation. 
 Another key difference between the two theories is unit of analysis. In RBV, it is 
an organization that possesses capabilities, but public value management discusses the 
capabilities that an individual public manager has to own. However, it would not be 
inappropriate to assume that the capabilities held by members in an organization 
collectively constitute organizational capabilities. For that matter, I believe that the public 
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value management theory can be applied in the organizational level of research, as in 
Moore and Khagram (2004), who attempt to analyze corporate strategies in the business 
context with the lens of public value management. 
 
Table 5. Comparison between Resource-Based View and Public Value Management 
 Resource-Based View Public Value Management 
Discipline Strategic Management Public Management 
Theme 
The variance in organizations’ 
performance can be explained by 
heterogeneity in resources held by 
the organizations. 
Public officials should strive to 
maximize public value, just as do 
managers in for-profit firms seek to 
maximize private value. 
Objective of 
Organizations 
Achieve and sustain competitive 
advantages and supernormal 
economic rents 
Create and maximize public value; 
does not specify which value to 
create 
Alternative Views 
Competitive forces (Porter 1985) Traditional public management 
New public management 
Capabilities 
Does not specify which 
organizational capabilities are 
important for competitive 
advantages. It depends on 
industries or environments that a 
firm resides in 
 Operational Capability 
 Communication Capability 
 Collaborative Capability 
 Innovative Capability 
 Political Capability 
 Value, Rarity, Inimitability, 
Imperfect mobility (Barney 
1991) 
 Scarcity, Appropriability, 
Inimitability, Imperfect 
substitutability, Limited 
tradability (Amit and 
Schoemaker 1993) 
Does not specify which attribute of 
organizational resources matters 
Unit of Analysis 
Organization Individual public managers, but 




Wade and Hulland (2004) 
Melville et al. (2004) 
Piccoli and Ives (2005) 




Even though RBV has been a fertile theoretical framework on the IT business 
value literature, I find that the public value management literature is a more appropriate 
theoretical approach in the public sector IT value studies for several reasons. First, the 
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foremost objective of firms in RBV is to attain competitive advantages against competing 
firms and to prevent them from eroding (Picolii and Ives 2005). In the public sector, 
however, such an aim is not as salient as in the private sector, even though the literature 
on competitive federalism argues that there still exist competitive environments between 
government agencies (Dye 1990, Breton 1991). Second, the resource-based view neither 
accounts for the plurality and multi-dimensionality of public value nor stresses the 
importance of the public manager’s ability to discover and formulate the desired public 
value. Third and most importantly, as mentioned above, RBV does not suggest 
specifically which organizational capability is paramount to the value creation in the 
public sector organizations. It merely suggests the attributes of resources and capabilities 
that are essential to effective competition, which is in general not a significant concern in 
the public sector. 
In the subsequent section, I discuss the theoretical model presented in Figure 3 in 
detail that combines the IS and public value management literatures. 
 
2.4. The Link from IT Resources to Public Value  
 
 Following Bacharach (1989), the theoretical development in this manuscript aims 
at proposing a set of constructs and relationships among the constructs that explain the 
value creation mechanisms from IT resources and, to some extent, predict how future 
technological developments will advance public value in the public sector organizations. 
Therefore, the theory in this study is bounded in the context of governments. Figure 3 
shows the three constructs in my theoretical development – IT resources, organizational 
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capabilities, and organizational performance. This section outlines the relationships 
among these constructs, as crystallized into the four propositions below. 
Based on the review on public value management literature, I suggest four key 
capabilities in public organizations that are pivotal in advancing public value generation – 
operational capability, communication capability, partnering capability, and innovative 
capability. I do not maintain that these capabilities represent the universe of public value 
management capabilities. For example, the literature highlights that it is imperative for 
public managers to equip with political savvy to engage in political processes (Moore 
1995, Alford and Hughes 2008). But, I do not consider such an ability of political 
involvement in this study. I here theorize that as de cribed in Figure 3, it is the set of four 
capabilities that play a mediating role between IT resources and pubic value creation. 
 
2.4.1. IT Resources and Operational Capability 
 One of the primary ways to accomplish greater public value is to improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of public service production. In other words, public value is 
enhanced when a government improves its operational capability by increasing the 
quality or quantity of public services with fewer inputs. As Moore (1995) puts it, 
 
“It is not enough to say that public managers create results that are valued; 
they must be able to show that the results are worth the cost of private 
consumption and unrestrained liberty forgone in producing the desirable 
results. Only then can we be sure that some public value has been 
created.” (Moore 1995, pp. 57) 
 
By the same token, Alford and Hughes (2008) argue that “although the term public value 
draws our attention to results or outcomes, it does not ignore inputs and processes. … 
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creating public value will mean maximizing within a constraint, that is, seeking the 
greatest possible benefit to the public within the available monetary or legal resources” (p. 
3). This implies that lessening such a resource constrai t, i.e. making administrative 
processes more efficient, also leads to greater public value. 
The impact of IT resources on operational capability can be explained by the three 
strategic roles that IT resources play in business organizations – the automate, informate, 
and transform roles (Zuboff 1985, Chatterjee et al. 2001, Dehning a d Richardson 2003, 
Anderson et al. 2006). The most essential and significa t role of IT is to automate 
business processes that traditionally have been driven mostly by paper handling and 
therefore tended to be laborious and error-prone. It is estimated that automating one 
transaction saves approximately $154 in labor costs (Center for Digital Government 
2006). Hence, given the large number of transactions a government agency usually 
handles, the value impact of automating business processes can be enormous. 
Automating processes can take place in the two fronts – internal administration processes 
and external service delivery to citizens (Moon 2002, Lim and Tang 2008).  
Since the early MIS era, information systems have continued to play a key role in 
the public sector organizations in automating interal processes such as human resource 
and financial management (Danziger 1979, Kraemer and Dedrick 1997). For instance, the 
Department of Transportation in the State of North Carolina adopted a tablet PC-based 
mobile inspection system for state highways and roads (NASCIO 2009). Automating 
paper-based inspection processes for more than 21,000 bridges, culverts, and signs, the 
system drastically improves both the efficiency and accuracy of the processes. The 
system not only brings a cost saving but also enabls timely maintenances of state 
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infrastructures, enhancing the safety of statewide transportation systems. This example 
illustrates how IT resources (the new mobile inspection systems) improve the efficiency 
and effectiveness of the infrastructure maintenance process. 
Moving public service delivery to citizens from a fce-to-face basis to the 
electronic provision via the Internet may benefit bo h governments and citizens. Now in 
many jurisdictions, citizens are able to conduct activities on the Internet such as tax 
filings, license application and renewals, voter registration, and accessing to government 
records and information (Thomas and Strieb 2005, Norris and Moon 2005). Such online 
services create public value in two ways – by directly saving citizens time and effort to 
physically visit government offices and by improving the productivity of transactions 
(Cresswell et al. 2006). For example, the Motor Fuel Automation Project in the State of 
Michigan (NASCIO 2005), which includes electronic reporting and processing of fuel tax 
transactions, generates various benefits for both gas retailers and the state. Gas retailers 
can integrate their own financial systems with the tax filing systems via Web services, 
enhancing productivity and accuracy of tax processing. The State of Michigan earns both 
increased tax revenues and a higher quality of tax data for effective tax auditing. 
With respect to the informate role, IT resources enable governments to utilize a 
vast range of information and data in an innovative manner. One of the most prominent 
uses of information in government administration is in the public safety area. A number 
of law enforcement agencies in the federal, state and local level strategically adopt 
business intelligence and data-mining systems. Digitized crime data and state-of-art 
analytic tools bring new intelligence to law enforcement agents, who used to rely mostly 
on their own insights and experiences in targeting offenders and solving crimes. 
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Analyzing and evaluating incident patterns and histor es, the agencies are now able to 
conduct more proactive, predictive patrols and deployment of law enforcement personnel, 
specifically targeting on most likely neighborhoods or criminal groups. According to a 
report by Government Technology, the City of Memphis, Tennessee has achieved a 31% 
reduction in crimes and a 15.4% reduction in violent crimes since 2006 (Digital 
Communities 2010), representing an accomplishment of considerable public value. 
Third, studies on public administration put forth that IT resources can transform 
public organizations by alleviating bureaucracy andre  tapes. Red tapes, a manifestation 
of excessive bureaucracy (Welch and Pandey 2007), are defined as rules, regulations, and 
procedures that remain in force and entail a compliance burden but do not advance the 
legitimate purposes the rules were intended to serve (Bozeman 2000, Moon and 
Bretschneider 2002). Researchers in public administrat on have been interested in 
studying the relationship between IT resources and red tapes. There are two competing 
contentions regarding the relationship. On the one hand, the presence of significant red 
tapes in organizations provokes interests in technology adoption, a theory called the 
“demand pull” hypothesis (Pandey and Bretschneider 1997, Moon and Bretschneider 
2002). On the other hand, the “technology push” hypothesis suggests that technology 
usages are related to a reduction in red tapes (Welch and Pandey 2007). Both of the 
hypotheses receive some empirical support. Researchers explain that IT resources make 
coordination and communications between employees or between groups more seamless 
and streamlined (Heintze and Bretschneider 2000). In addition, recording every activity 
and transaction promote officials’ accountability, reducing the incentives of government 
officials to unnecessarily cause administrative delay. Thus, it is expected that IT can 
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transform public organizations in such a way that decision making and information 
processing become faster and less deterred by excessive rules and regulations.  
 The aforementioned roles of IT resources in the public sector organizations thus 
explain that IT resources can have a substantial impact on the operational capacity of 
public organizations, which contributes to greater public value. Hence, I propose the 
following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1. IT resources contribute to creating public value by enhancing the 
operational capacity of public organizations. 
 
2.4.2. IT Resources and Communication Capability 
 One of the mantras in public value management is that the involvement of a large 
number of stakeholder groups in policy decision andservice delivery is crucial. As Stoker 
(2006) elaborately puts it, 
 
Politicians and officials have a particular legitimacy given the government 
is elected, but there are other valid claims to legitimacy from among 
others, including business partners, neighborhood leaders, those with 
knowledge about services as professionals or users, and those in a position 
of oversight or regulators. … The public value management paradigm 
relies on a stakeholder conception of legitimacy in its governance 
arrangements. The fundamental idea is that for a decision to be legitimate 
or for a judgment to be made, it is necessary to have all the stakeholders 
involved. (Stoker 2006, p. 47) 
 
Such a claim stressing the involvement of a broad range of actors is also presented by the 
network governance literature (e.g. Bogason and Musso 2006, Benington 2011). This 
literature argues that decisions on policies and public services are increasingly being 
45  
 
made not by governments alone, but via deliberation and negotiations involving 
governments, non-governmental organizations (NGO), and individual citizens, given the 
increasing size and complexity in public administration. 
In many cases, however, it is by no means straightforward to lure various 
stakeholders in participating in decision making. Ordinary citizens tend to be busy and 
preoccupied with their own everyday lives. Engaging in decision markings in such ways 
as attending meetings, writing formal feedback, andresponding to surveys may require 
significant time commitment (Ho 2002). In this respct, IT resources provide an 
alternative venue for a broad range of participation and dialogues from as many relevant 
stakeholders as possible. Stoker (2006) continues to argue that “new information and 
communication technologies offer a range of further opportunities to get people’s 
participation in ways that are flexible, attractive to them, and not too time-consuming” (p. 
48). Such an advance materializes as e-Government initiatives, which refer to the 
delivery of government information and services online through the Internet or other 
digital means (West 2004). According to the e-Government evolution models proposed 
by Moon (2002) and West (2004), one of the key features of e-Governments is a two-way 
communication. Government Web sites can not only unilaterally publish information or 
execute automated transactions, but also make citizens’ voices to be heard, enabling 
direct access to governments. In this way, governments can actively seek opinions of the 
public on policy issues (Chadwick and May 2003). Tools for two-way communication 
include online public forum, online voting, and so on. In addition, studies in public 
administration present preliminary empirical evidenc  showing that two-way 
communications between governments and citizens may i prove attitudes and trust to 
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governments (West 2004, Welch et al. 2004, Tolbert and Mossberger 2006), which are 
among the key public value elements (Kelley et al. 2002). 
Recently, governments at all levels are using Web 2.0 technologies to solicit 
citizens’ ideas for government administration. In 2008, the Office of the President-Elect 
Obama set up Citizen’s Briefing Book site, collecting policy recommendations from 
ordinary citizens for the new administration. State nd local governments such as the 
State of California7 or the City of Manor, Texas (Vander Veen 2010) are lso operating 
similar platforms where residents can submit suggestions and evaluate ones submitted by 
peer citizens. Thus, Web 2.0 tools offer governments the ability to make sense of what 
the public wants and concerns and to engage in close, real-time deliberation with citizens 
(Hui and Hayllar 2010).  
 It is also stressed that in order to ensure broad p rticipations in deliberation 
processes and to increase the acceptance of public services, public officials should be 
active in public information campaigns (Weiss and Tschirhart 1994) or  what Moore 
(1995) calls “public sector marketing” or “strategic communication” (p. 185). These aim 
at convincing citizens the importance and legitimacy of public services and policy 
decisions. Weiss and Tschirhart (1994) also explain that despite some adverse effects of 
public information campaigns, they “can enrich the possibilities for democratic 
participation. Better-informed citizens may participate more knowledgeably and 
effectively in all democratic processes” (p. 99). Again, e-Government initiatives can be 
an effective vehicle in such an effort. IT resources and the use of the Internet can increase 
the effectiveness of public information campaigns by targeting right audiences and 
offering a variety of mediums and formats. Weiss and Tschirhart (1994) argue that a way 
                                                
7 http://www.govtech.com/dc/744503  
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to mitigate negative consequences of a public information campaign such as suppressing 
the expression of the public’s opinion is to incorporate a venue for reply, discussion, or 
debate from the target audience, a feature that e-Government initiatives can offer. 
 Transparency and accountability in government administration, especially 
budgeting and financial management, are also considered to be part of public value (Beck 
Jørgensen and Bozeman 2007), and studies on e-Governments regard IT and the Internet 
as a great tool for facilitating such values. Accountability in public organizations can be 
met when the behavior and performance of public managers fulfill or exceed the 
expectation of citizens and their representatives (Justice et al. 2006). Transparency is 
considered to be a necessary condition for accountability, as citizens and stakeholders 
have to be able to assess the performance and compliance of administration. 
Governments can utilize IT resources and the Interne  to ensure the transparency and 
accountability. Nowadays, many governments post budgeting and finance information on 
their Web sites ranging from comprehensive annual fin ncial reports (CARF) to detailed 
breakdown information on budgets and interactive tools for analyses (Rodríguez Bolívar 
et al. 2004, Justice et al. 2006). These practices enrich openness and accessibility of 
information on government administration by allowing citizens, especially those without 
expert knowledge on the administration, to evaluate how public managers use resources 
that citizens provide in delivering public services. 
 As laid out so far, IT resources can improve the communication capacity of public 
organizations in many ways. Public officials can employ IT resources in facilitating 
bilateral communications with citizens and other stakeholders. By bilateral 
communications, it means that a government can deliver messages to broader and 
48  
 
targeted audiences; at the same time, it can solicit the r opinions and suggestions and 
attract as many of them as possible to join in the deliberation for policy formulation and 
public service delivery. IT resources can enhance the ability of the government to make 
information more open and accessible to the general pub ic, creating public value in 
transparency and democratic accountability. In sum, I propose the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2. IT resources contribute to creating public value by enhancing the 
communication capacity of public organizations. 
 
2.4.3. IT Resources and Partnering Capability 
 Management of public organizations driven by public value necessitates the 
development of partnering capacity with peer governme t agencies as well as outside 
private organizations. Stoker (2006) stresses that effective provision of public services 
requires an open-minded approach to identify the best supplier, be it in the public, private, 
or voluntary sector. He continues to argue that the choice of the supplier should be based 
not on ideological or political consideration but on the judgment on which best fulfills the 
goal of public value creation. Kelley et al. (2002) advocate the presence of multiple 
suppliers in the public and private sector for a single service, so that citizens can self-
select based on their preferences. Following this proposition, Alford and Hughes (2007) 
suggest the four service delivery models – in-house production, service agency, 
partnering, and classical contracting.  
The literature also emphasizes that in an increasingly dynamic environment, 
provision of a certain public service by a single organization may not be enough to fulfill 
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changing needs and aspirations of the public. Broussine (2003) stresses that “in order to 
solve complex problems, public leaders have to be abl to initiate concerted action not 
only within their own organizations but among a set of stakeholders with different and 
competing interests” (p. 175). Thus, co-production by multiple government agencies or 
public-private hybrid production may be necessary. There is also a recently emerging 
research stream on collaborative public management (Alford and Hughes 2007) or hybrid 
governance, in which the lines between the public, non-profit, and private sectors are 
being blurred (Klitgaard and Treverton 2004). This literature states that collaborative 
public management has become an emerging and increasingly prominent form of 
governing, thanks to decentralized power structures in many societies and increased 
complexity in many public affair issues that a single overnment organization can hardly 
handle alone. I below argue that IT resources play a crucial role in enabling such 
cooperation transcending traditional organizational boundaries. 
IT resources such as tightly integrated inter-organizational systems (IOS), 
seamless information sharing, and advance communication technologies facilitate 
collaboration and cooperation between government agencies. For example, Waukesha 
County, Wisconsin established Waukesha County Communication Center (WCC), the 
county-wide emergency call and dispatch headquarter (Schulz and Tuma 2007). This 
project was initiated by the county sheriff but driven by the collaboration of several local 
municipality agencies including police and fire departments. Among the objectives was 
to improve the quality of public safety services throughout the county, which had been 
fragmented by municipality boundaries. By consolidating the call centers of small local 
governments into one entity and coordinating county-wide dispatch functions, WCC 
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could achieve economies of scale in operation and staffing, reduce the burden of local 
governments, and proactively adopt advanced, yet expensive technologies such as 
wireless 911 systems or computer-aided dispatch tools. DeMarie (2004) studies the use of 
communication technologies by geographically dispere teams in the Radioactive Waste 
Management Project of Nevada Department of Energy. This project is involved by a 
variety of professions such as scientists, engineers, and community relation managers as 
well as government officials from several agencies in U.S. Department of Energy and the 
State of Nevada. Moreover, they are located in six different states including California, 
Nevada, and Washington, D.C.  This case study reports that the use of such collaboration 
technologies as groupware and video-conferencing improves team performance in many 
aspects, which are both tangible and intangible, including improved productivity, reduced 
costs, enhanced work quality, and attraction and retention of competent project 
participants. 
As IT resources are a key ingredient in integration and cooperation between 
suppliers, producers, and customers in the private sector (Barua et al. 2004), can 
government agencies utilize IT resources in cooperating with private sector organizations, 
be they not-for-profit or for-profit. Luna-Reyes etal. (2007) chronicle a case of the 
Bureau of Housing Services (BHS) of the State of New York, which provides homeless 
support services in a partnership with local governme ts and not-for-profit organizations 
such as the Salvation Army and the American Red Cross. Such local organizations 
manage shelters and assist programs and thus directly interact with the homeless, while 
the BHS provides funding to the local organizations a d oversees their programs and 
facilities. This partnership emerges as either governm nts or not-for-profit organizations 
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alone cannot effectively manage the support programs for homeless people. Local 
organizations, especially small mom-and-pop facilities, lack of financial resources and 
thus need guidance from the authority, while the state government does not have direct, 
hand-on knowledge on local needs (Agranoff 2004). It is stressed in the case that for the 
effective management of the program, integration and sharing of information resources 
that are fragmented and dispersed throughout various state agencies and organizations 
was imperative. Each state agency and supporting group has own information repositories 
on beneficiaries, their medical or criminal histories, facilities, and programs. The case 
illustrates the integration process of the Homeless Information Management System for 
effective and successful collaboration in delivering homeless assistance programs. In 
addition to information, for this type of collaboration to succeed, sharing of knowledge 
and technical expertise among participating organizations is pivotal (McGuire et al. 2011), 
and inter-organizational knowledge exchange and collab rative tools (Majchrzak et al. 
2000) facilitate such knowledge sharing. 
Like for-profit firms, public organizations are increasingly needed to develop the 
ability to cooperate and collaborate with peer agencies and outside private-sector 
organizations. Anecdotal evidence and academic studies consistently point out that to 
develop such an ability, governments need to make a smart use of IT resources for more 
seamless information sharing and process integration. This discussion leads me to 
propose the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 3. IT resources contribute to creating public value by enhancing the 




2.4.4. IT Resources and Innovative Capability 
Conventional wisdom may suggest that innovation in the public sector is an 
oxymoron (Borins 2002). This originates from the absence of competitive pressures and 
profit motives, the presence of bureaucratic public managers and outdated management 
structure, and so on. However, recent research in public administration including public 
value management recognizes the importance of innovation in public management, and it 
is found that public managers can play a key role in initiating and leading innovation. For 
instance, Borins (2002) conducted a quantitative analysis with innovation awards in 
several countries that are given to agencies that succe sfully completed innovation 
projects. The analysis reveals that the majority of innovation projects were initiated by 
public organization leaders or middle managers, rather than by politicians or citizens. 
The prior public management models (traditional public management and new 
public management) assume that surrounding environments in which governments 
operate are stable and unchanging. Thus, the responsibility of public managers is to 
simply maintain the status quo and follow the predefined rules and procedures suited to 
existing environments. Public value management model challenges this assumption, and 
Moore (1995) emphasizes the innovative capability of public organizations for value 
creation in changing environments. He states that  
 
It is not enough that managers simply maintain the continuity of their 
organizations, or even that the organizations becom efficient in current 
tasks. It is also important that the enterprise be adaptable to new purposes 




Thus, the literature stresses that governments be vigilant over understanding evolving 
circumstances and sensing changing needs and aspirations of various stakeholders. 
Governments need to become flexible and agile in coping with emerging challenges 
(Dunleavy et al. 2006). I here argue that IT resources can develop the innovative 
capability by enabling public managers to drastically redefine existing public services or 
to create a whole new sort of public services (Hartley 2011) that would not have been 
impossible to offer without IT.  
A public management model that describes the fundamental redefinition of public 
services is termed as ‘borderless governments’ (Miszew ki 2007) or ‘Government-as-a-
Service’ (Center for Digital Government 2006), in which public agencies are organized 
not by functions or jurisdictions but by citizens’ needs, and the boundaries between 
agencies become more invisible to the public. Ho (2002) suggests a ‘one-stop service 
center’ model. A one-stop service center is an umbrella organization that operates on top 
of existing functional departments and is intended to maximize the convenience and 
satisfaction of users through service integration. The use of IT resources is crucial in this 
model, in that officials in such a service center neds to seamlessly coordinate several 
departments for provision of integrated services. Similarly, Dunleavy et al. (2006) 
suggest ‘client-based or need-based reorganization’, in which government agencies that 
serve similar purposes are reintegrated.  
Michigan Business Portal is a case in point (NASCIO 2006). This system intends 
to serve the purpose of simulating economic growth ithin the state in a changing 
environment represented by the decline in the state’  automotive industry. Here, all 
services, processes, and information relevant to starting a new business such as 
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registration or tax payment are consolidated into a single Web site, so that processes for 
business start-ups are drastically simplified. Thus, b siness owners do not need to contact 
multiple state agencies individually. Enabled by IT resources, this one-stop service center 
model can augment citizens’ satisfaction and thus generate public value by “preventing 
bureaucracies from sending the citizen back and forth from pillar to post, which still is 
one of the main complaints about the functioning of public bureaucracies” (Snellen 2000, 
p. 220). 
IT resources can also play a pivotal role in inventing a new public service model. 
For example, IT resources are an indispensable component in Illinois National Electronic 
Disease Surveillance System (I-NEDSS) (NASCIO 2005). This system aims at 
identifying and tracking an outbreak of infectious diseases that might escalate to a 
statewide emergency. It interconnects local healthcre providers and state and federal 
agencies such as Center for Disease Control and Prevention. This initiative is a response 
to the continuous emergence of new types of pandemic diseases such as H1N1 and the 
increasing threat of biological terroristic attacks. The real-time detection and response 
system to outbreaks could not be operated without the state-of-the-art network 
infrastructure and data analytic systems. 
The literature on public value management asserts that innovation should not be a 
term that only appears in the private sector. Public organizations also need to 
continuously innovate themselves to navigate a turbulent environment and keep 
delivering values to the public. The arguments on IT resources and the innovative 




Proposition 4. IT resources contribute to creating public value by enhancing innovative 
capacity of public organizations. 
 
 Table 6 summarizes the discussions in Section 2.4. 
 
Table 6. Summary of Propositions 
Path Mechanisms 
Proposition 1: IT resources  
Operational Capabilities  Public Value 
Automate manual, paper-based organizational 
processes 
Informate public employees for better decision 
making and innovative provision of public 
services 
Transform bureaucratic organizations into 
responsive, agile ones 
Proposition 2: IT resources  
Communicational Capabilities  Public 
Value 
Make public information campaigns more 
effective 
Solicit involvement of stakeholders in policy 
decisions and public service delivery 
Promote accountability and democratic processes 
by making information open and accessible 
Proposition 3: IT resources  
Partnering Capabilities  Public Value 
Enable collaboration and cooperation between 
governments or with private-sector 
organizations 
Proposition 4: IT resources  
Innovative Capabilities  Public Value 
Redefine the boundary and scope of public 
services and organizations 




 Taking the process-level approach from the literature on IT resources and value 
and drawing on the emerging public value management p rspective, this study develops a 
theoretical model that explains how IT resources in governments contribute to 
organizational performance as measured by public vaue creation. With prior studies in 
public administration and anecdotal evidence, I explicate that IT resources help public 
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organizations nurture the four crucial organizational capabilities – operational, 
communication, partnering, and innovative capabilities. In turn, an improvement in these 
organizational capabilities contributes to greater public value creation.  
 In future studies, I will provide an answer to in what context IT resources 
contribute to greater public value. I will attempt to find key moderating factors in the 
relationship between IT resources, organizational capabilities, and public value creation. 
Such factors can be grouped in four categories – (i) leadership of top management 
(legislatures, elected officials, and high-ranking appointed officials) in IT management, 
(ii) organizational acceptance and effective use of IT, (iii) citizens’ acceptance of IT-
driven changes and public services, and (iv) governm nt-business partnerships. I will 
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CHAPTER 3.  
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND ADMINISTRATIVE EFFICIENCY IN U.S. 




 To do more with less, governments go digital. 
 - Steve Lohr, The New York Times, October 10th, 2009 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide empirical evidence that supports 
Proposition 1 in Chapter 2 that IT resources create public value by improving the 
operational capability of the public sector organiztions. In addition, this chapter is 
motivated by my perspective that the approach to measure the value effect of IT 
investments in the private sector that has been adopte  in the prior literature may not be 
directly applicable in the government context. 
The differences between the private and public sector that I have laid out in 
Section 1.1 necessitate the use of alternative empirical approaches for the public sector 
research. Most importantly, I find that the production function framework, which has 
been a de facto approach since 1990s (e.g. Hitt and Brynjolfsson 1996, Brynjolfsson and 
Hitt 1996, Dewan and Kraemer 2000), may not be directly applicable in the context of 
this study. State governments produce a range of gods and services that not only have 
diverse objectives but are hard to be quantified into a single measure such as profits in the 
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commercial business. I was not able to find an aggre ate measure for government outputs 
that corresponds to sales or value-added in the private sector. More subtly, the production 
function assumes that outputs are endogenous, i.e. firms maximize the amount of outputs 
for a given level of input used. I believe, on the other hand, that in the public sector 
context, it is more appropriate to assume that governm nt outputs are exogenously given, 
and government agencies minimize expenditures for a given level of public services to 
produce. Consequently, I adopt the stochastic frontier estimation as a baseline empirical 
approach (De Borger and Kerstens 1996, Geys 2006) that I expect to be more suitable in 
the current context. A detailed explanation on the c oice of empirical technique is to 
follow in the subsequent sections. 
I choose U.S. state governments as the focal context to study IT value in the 
public sector organizations for the following reason . State governments have used 
information technologies extensively for the internal administration as well as for the 
delivery of public services such as education, social welfare, healthcare, and law 
enforcement. Like for-profit firms, many state governments strategically adopt IT to 
achieve greater efficiency and to provide more respon ive public services (NASCIO 
2005). For the last several years, an e-Government initiative, whose main purpose is to 
provide the public with greater access to governments via the Internet, has become a 
major movement in the government sector (West 2004, Robbins and Miller 2005). In 
addition, IT is considered an important means to facilit te seamless collaborations among 
state, federal, and local government agencies (NASCIO 2007a). Therefore, it is a 
legitimate question from the perspective of taxpayers whether these efforts indeed 
generate sufficient value to the states and the taxpayers. 
68  
 
As this study is one of the early studies for IT value in the public sector, among 
many research issues, I choose to study the impact of IT on state governments' 
administrative efficiency, which refers to the extent to which a government provides 
public goods and services with limited resources (Downs and Larkey 1986, p. 6, Stiglitz 
2000, p. 149). Utilizing the IT budget data from the National Association of State CIOs, 
the census data on state government expenditures, and a variety of information on public 
services that state governments supply, I estimate the relationship between IT intensity 
(Bharawaj et al. 1999, Anderson et al. 2006) and technical cost efficiency, a proxy for 
administrative efficiency. The empirical analyses provide evidence for this relationship to 
be positive and statistically significant. That is,higher IT investments are related to 
greater efficiency in the states. All others being equal, the results indicate that a $1 
increase in per capita IT budget is associated witha $4.18 decline in per capita cost in 
operation and capital depreciation. Further analyses show that this sizeable effect persists 
over a period of time. In addition, I also conducted a series of robustness checks through 
the use of alternative functional specifications and measures for outputs and input prices. 
Overall, the results remain consistent under these robustness checks. Finally, I find that 
the contribution of IT investments to efficiency is contingent upon the size of state gross 
domestic product (GDP), the centrality of IT management in state governments, and the 
size of a central IT organization. 
 The present research contributes to the literature by xpanding the scope of IT 
value studies to an area that to the best of my knowledge, few previous works in the IS 
discipline have dealt with. I discover a meaningful performance impact of IT in the 
government sector, where competitive pressure for pr fits is not the major motive. This 
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study provides quantitative evidence that IT enables governments to do more with less in 
the apparent absence of desire for efficiency and profit. The secondary contribution is to 
introduce the use of an empirical approach for measuring IT value that is not frequently 
used in the IS field – the translog cost function model with stochastic frontier estimation. 
I believe that this approach can be used in studying the performance effect of IT in other 
not-for-profit sector contexts. 
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. The following section offers 
hypothesis development and empirical model. Section 3.3 explains data sources and 
measures. Section 3.4 presents the main result followed by a series of sensitivity analyses 
to check the robustness of the result. The chapter concludes with discussions, limitations, 
and future research directions. 
 
3.2. Hypothesis and Empirical Model 
 
3.2.1. Hypothesis 
As laid out above, this study investigates the cost efficiency effect of IT 
investments. The IS literature extensively documents the cost reduction effect. For 
example, Mitra and Chaya (1996) show that firms with greater spending on IT report 
lower costs of goods sold (COGS) and selling and general administration (SGA) 
expenses. Santhanam and Hartono (2003) also provide e i nce supporting that firms 
identified as IT leaders demonstrate significantly lower COGS, SGA expenses, and 
operating expenses than industry averages. In another s udy, Zhu (2004) reveals that in 
the retail industry, higher IT infrastructure investments are associated with lower COGS 
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per employee, a relationship that is greater when a firm has better e-commerce capability. 
Aral and Weill (2007) also show that greater investments on transactional information 
systems are associated with lower COGS. While the effect of IT on costs of goods sold 
may not be directly applicable to the public sector, overall efficiency benefits of IT do 
apply in this context, since government agencies are usually expected to deliver 
necessary services to citizens with as little revenues (or tax-collection) as possible. 
Therefore, as discussed earlier, cost-efficiency outcomes are a more appropriate starting 
point to examine the economic contribution of IT in the public sector.  
In the economic literature, studies by public economists on government 
efficiencies treat government organizations as a producer of multiple public goods using 
a number of inputs (e.g. Fiorina and Noll 1978, Bewley 1981, Bergstrom et al. 1986), as 
described in Figure 4. In this model, a government purchases m inputs and transforms 
them with a certain production technology f to produce n outputs. In this context, several 
efficiency factors (z1, z2, …, zl) may contribute to the productivity or efficiency in this 
production process. In this study, based on the prior theory and anecdotal evidence 
discussed above, I consider IT investments by stategov rnments as one factor. Therefore, 
drawing on the automate and informate role of IT, I hypothesize a positive association 
between state IT intensity (i.e. a relative measure of IT investments by the state 
government) and administrative efficiency. 
 


















IT z1 z2 zl
 
(See Fiorina and Noll 1978, Bewley 1981, Bergstrom et al. 1986) 
 
3.2.2. Empirical Model 
I estimate the impact of IT investments on administrative efficiency with a two-
stage estimation approach based on a multi-product translog cost function (Caves et al. 
1980, Caves et al. 1981). This specification has been used in the prior literature in public 
economics (Geys 2006, De Borger and Kersten 1996, Worthington 2000). In the first 
stage, I estimate cost inefficiency of each state-year observation with a stochastic frontier 
model (Aigner et al. 1997). I treat this efficiency as a proxy for administrative efficiency. 
In the second stage, the estimated cost efficiency is regressed on IT intensity and other 
exogenous factors that the literature has identified to influence inefficiency in 
governments.  
Although many prior IT value studies have adopted a production function model 
to study the impact of IT in the for profit business etting (Brynjofsson and Hitt 1996, 
Dewan and Min 1997, Dewan and Kraemer 2000), I believ  that a multi-product translog 
cost function is more suitable in my context for the ree reasons – the unavailability of 
an aggregate measure for the state government outputs, he exogeneity of the outputs, and 
the absence of short-term effects of IT on the outputs. 
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First, to the best of my knowledge, it is difficult to find an appropriate measure to 
gauge the collective amount of outputs that state governments produce. While in the for-
profit context, such measures as sales or value-addd can account for aggregate outputs 
that a firm supplies, to the best of my knowledge, the literature has not established a 
single measure that represents a variety of public services that state governments offer 
such as education, transportation, and so forth. In addition, in my context, there may be 
various measures for the output of a single public service (e.g. dropout rate for public 
education), but I would underestimate the contribution of IT to the productivity of public 
service delivery if I were to estimate the impact on one service area. Using the production 
function model, Lee and Perry (2002) relate IT assets in U.S. state governments to state 
GDP, a proxy they use for state government productivity, and find a positive impact of IT 
on state GDP. However, I do not believe that state GDP represents outputs produced by 
the state government, as it also accounts for outputs from the private sector.  
Second, the prior literature in economics has pointed out that outputs can be 
considered exogenous under some conditions, and thus the cost function approach may 
be more appropriate to study efficiency in the following contexts – (i) when production is 
regulated (Caves et al. 1981), (ii) when production is price-inelastic (Ray 1982), or (iii) 
when outputs cannot be stored (Kumbharkar and Lovell 2000). Kumbharkar and Lovell 
(2000) note that theoretically, a production and a cost function are equivalent, but in 
effect, the two functions have divergent behavioral assumptions. To put it differently, 
under the circumstances described above, an efficient producer minimizes the use of 
inputs, given the amount of outputs to be produced. The provision of public services by 
state governments shares almost all the characteristics mentioned above. 
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With respect to (i), state government production is regulated by various federal 
and state laws, policies, and statutes, and thus most of the public services are entitlement 
programs. For example, the Social Security Act requir s every state to provide a 
healthcare benefit program to residents with limited ncomes. Also, state governments are 
in charge of maintaining the Interstate Highway System within each jurisdiction under 
the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956. Thus, state governments are bounded by an 
exogenous factor, which is the federal laws, and for such outputs, it is outside of the state 
governments’ purview to change the amount of outputs8. In terms of (ii), as production is 
regulated, state governments should maintain the provision of the services, even when 
input prices (labor or capital) or output prices (tax revenues) change. Even for outputs 
whose provision is under jurisdiction of state governments such as education, adjusting 
the extent of provision due to price changes such as a reduction in tax revenues requires 
policy making by executive branches, deliberation among stakeholders and interests 
groups, and legislative processes, all of which usually take several months or years. Thus, 
it makes sense to consider that state government production is price-inelastic, at least in 
the short-run, which this study deals with. Lastly, for (iii), state government outputs such 
as education or public safety are certainly consumed immediately after production. As 
there is essentially no inventory for state outputs, s ates need to maintain the stability of 
production, which once again renders outputs exogenus. 
Third and relatedly, I do not expect that IT investments to have an impact on the 
amount of state government outputs, especially in the short run. It is likely that IT 
                                                
8 Medicaid is a healthcare program administered by state governments, and it is discretion of a state to 
determine the eligibilities and extent of benefits. But, as its funding is largely provided by the federal 




improves the productivity of public service delivery, but it is unlikely that such 
improvement immediately leads to an increase in the amount of public service production. 
As I just mentioned above, adjusting the amount of outputs in governments requires 
policy making, negotiation, and legislative processes that are lengthy. Provided that the 
focus is on the relatively short term effect of IT investments in state governments, it 
makes sense that the amount of government outputs is exogenous with respect to IT 
investments. 
As stated in this section, in contrast to the production function model where 
output is assumed to be endogenous, in my context, I believe that it is more appropriate to 
assume that most outputs are determined exogenously and state governments attempt to 
limit the use of inputs9. Thus, I adopt a multi-product translog cost function. This 
function is particularly suitable as it allows me to include multiple outputs measures in 
the estimation that are difficult to be aggregated an models the provision of government 
outputs, each of which has different objectives. 
 
3.3. Data and Methods 
 
3.3.1. Two Stage Estimation Using Stochastic Frontier Model 
I use a stochastic cost frontier model to estimate administrative efficiency. This 
model is widely used in the public sector context for measuring efficiencies. For example, 
                                                
9 It may be the case that state government outputs are endogenous to the extent that state government 
production is determined by the availability of input resources. In other words, they may not entirely be 
exogenous. However, if we consider a continuum of exog neity and endogeneity, we believe that state 
government outputs are closer to exogeneity, compared to the private sector goods. In other words, the 
extent to which outputs are endogenous is less that that of private goods. In addition, such an extent may 
render our estimation with a cost function biased an inconsistent, but we do not believe that such bias and 
inconsistency would change our primary results drastic lly. 
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Davis and Hayes (1993) estimate the efficiency of plice departments in 141 Illinois 
municipalities based on the production function framework with stochastic frontier 
estimation. Grossman et al. (1999) and Conroy and Arguea (2003) adopt a similar 
approach in estimating efficiencies in 49 U.S. metropolitan cities and Florida public 
elementary schools, respectively. In measuring effici ncies of city administration in 304 
Flemish local governments, Geys (2006) employs the translog cost function with a 
stochastic frontier model. A similar model is used by De Borger and Kersten (1996) and 
Worthington (2000). An approach that relates efficien y to IT has also been taken in an 
IT productivity study by Lee and Barua (1999), who find that IT intensity is positively 
associated with technical and scale efficiency obtained from a stochastic frontier 
estimation with a production function model. 
Note that in the context of this study, state government efficiencies may be 
affected by various unobserved factors that are organizational or political in nature. In 
addition, even though states produce a wide range of public goods and services, I may not 
include all the measures for such outputs in the estimations. For this reason, I choose a 
stochastic frontier model rather than deterministic frontier models such as data 
envelopment analysis (e.g. Charnes et al. 1978) or goal programming models (Aigner and 
Chu 1968). Deterministic models do not account for random factors, measurement errors 
and unobserved state heterogeneity, which get lumped into the inefficiency measures 
(Lovell 1993). It is also argued that the absence of stochastic factors in the deterministic 
models makes it hard to conduct statistical testing a d inferences (Kumbharkar and 
Lovell 2000).  
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A typical stochastic frontier for a producer using multiple inputs as shown in 
Figure 4 is illustrated in Figure 5. Formally, Koopmans (1951) defines this producer as 
being technically efficient if and only if it cannot increase the production of an output 
without increasing any input or decreasing any other outputs. Following the definition by 
Kumbharkar and Lovell (2000, Figure 5), I define a fe sible production set GR as 
GR = {(y, x): x can produce y.}, 
where x and y refers to an input and an output vector, respectivly. In Figure 5, GR is 
represented by a region below the curve a-c-f-b. I also define an input set L(y) and an 
output set P(x) as follows. 
  L(y) = {x: (y, x) in GR} 
  P(x) = {y: (y, x) in GR} 
The line c-d and e-f in Figure 5 indicate L(y) and P(x), respectively. A production frontier 
f(x) and a cost frontier c(y, w) given an input price vector w are respectively defined as 
  f(x) = max{y: y in P(x)}, and 
  c(y, w) = minx{ w
Tx: x in L(y)}. 
Intuitively, (x, y) is in the production frontier if y is a maximum output that can be 
produced by x (the curve a-c-f-b in Figure 5). Also (x, y) is on the cost frontier if x is the 
least expensive set of inputs that can produce y. Here, technical cost inefficiency is 
defined as the ratio of actual cost to the cost on the cost frontier. I estimate this technical 

















Each dot represents an actual observation of input-output. 
  
In the present context, I have a panel data of state government production. The 
multi-product cost function for state governments with n outputs and m input prices (as 
shown in Figure 5) is given by  
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  (1) 
where k and t are subscripts for state and year, respectively. Ck,t is the total cost of state k 
at year t, Yi,k,t indicate the amount of outputs, and wi,k,t  are the input prices. The 
interaction terms in Eq. 1 are used for estimating economics of scale or input price 
elasticity, which are outside the scope of this research. In estimation, the constraints for 


























=∑  for i = 1, 2, …, n (2) 
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These constraints ensure that when all input prices wi are multiplied by x, the total cost C 
is multiplied by x as well, making the cost function homogenous with a degree of one. 
This is a reasonable assumption in the case of state government and public organizations 
(Geys 2006, De Borger and Kersten 1996). 
In the stochastic frontier model, a frontier is considered to be stochastic, based on 
a rationale that even maximum production levels may be influenced by various 
unobserved factors, random shocks, or statistical noise. A model suggested by Aigner et 
al. (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977) assumes that a residual εk,t in Eq. 1 
consists of two parts. 
 , , ,k t k t k tv uε = +        (3) 
Here, vk,t represents a random error and is assumed to follow a normal distribution of 
2(0, )vN σ . On the other hand, uk,t refers to a technical inefficiency factor, which in nature 
is greater than or equal to zero. Thus, it is assumed to follow an exponential distribution. 
Aigner et al. (1977) explain that vk,t represents random factors that influence production 
but are outside of a firm’s control. Also, vk,t is thought to be part of the cost frontier. On 
the other hand, uk,t is considered to be under the firm’s control and originate from such 
causes as mismanagement or organizational slacks. The parameters in Eq. 1 along with 
the standard deviation of the two error terms (vk,t and uk,t) can be estimated using 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation, and the details are p sented in Aigner et al. (1997). 
 Based on the estimated parameters (the coefficients of Eq. 1 and σv and σu), an 
unbiased estimate of the inefficiency of each observation can be obtained using the 
approach presented in Jondrow et al. (1982). They propose the following unbiased 





























= + , and (.)f  and (.)F  refer to the probability and cumulative density 
function of a exponential distribution, respectively. However, for ease of interpretation, I 
am more interested in estimating technical cost ineffici ncy (the ratio of actual cost to 
cost in the frontier), rather than uk,t itself. Since the cost function in Eq. 1 is expressed in 
logarithm of cost, ,exp( )k tu  represents technical inefficiency that I seek to measure. 
Battese and Coelli (1988) suggest an estimator for the technical inefficiency TEk,t of state 
k at year t as follows. 
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= −  and (.)Φ  is the cumulative distribution function of a standr  
normal distribution. 
In the second-stage of the estimation, I use this technical efficiency for each 
observation to assess the impact of IT. Here, I can estimate the impact of IT intensity on 
technical efficiency by regressing ,1 k tTE−  on IT intensity and control variables (z). 
Consistent with prior research (Brynjolfsson 1993), I use a lagged IT variable in the 
model shown below10.   
, 0 , 2 , , ,1 ( )k t IT k t zi i k t k tTE g IT zδ δ δ ξ−− = + + +∑     (6) 
                                                




As noted in the hypothesis, the primary parameter of my interest is δIT. I will examine 
whether δIT is positive and significant. Note that in my specification, TEk,t is a truncated 
variable, since it can only have values greater than 1. Hence I estimate Eq. 6 with OLS as 
well as Tobit regression. 
 
3.3.2. Measures and Data Sources 
 In the first-stage estimation with the cost function (Eq. 1), I include two input 
measures (m = 2) and four output measures (n = 4). First, the total cost (C) is the sum of 
per capita annual operation expense and capital depreciation (buildings and equipments). 
Operation expense is defined as “direct expenditure for compensation of own officers and 
employees and for supplies, materials and contractual services” (U.S. Census Bureau 
2006, p. 126) and acquired from annual State Governm nt Finances by the U.S. Census 
Bureau (Table 7). Annual capital depreciation data is acquired from Comprehensive 
Annual Financial Reports (CAFR) posted at states’ Web sites. Capital depreciation is 
reported from fiscal-year 2001 to 2008, and some state  do not post all eight-year reports 
at their Web sites, limiting the sample size to 377 state-years. Detailed information on 
data collection and measures is available in Appendix 1. All dollar terms are adjusted for 




Table 7. Data Sources 
Source Data Variable 
National Association of 
State CIOs 
Compendium of Digital 
Governments in the States (2002, 
2005) 
IT Intensity (IT1 and IT2) 
U.S. Census Bureau 
State Government Finances 
Operation expense (C), 
Capital price (w2), Federal 
grant (z4) 
State Government Employment & 
Payroll 
Labor price (w1) 
State Annual Population Estimate Population (z1) 
State Household Income Household income (z2) 
State governments’  
Web sites 
Comprehensive Annual Financial 
Reports (CAFR) 
Capital depreciation (C) 
Alternative capital price (w2) 
Bureau of Economic 
Accounts 
State Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) 
GDP (z3) 
Price Indexes for GDP 
National Conference of State 
Legislature 
State legislature and gubernatorial 
election results 
Governor (z5), Legislature 
(z6) 
State Higher Education 
Executive Officers 
State Higher Education Finance 
Survey 
Education (Y1) 
Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services 
National Health Expenditure Data 
by State of Resident 
Public Welfare (Y2) 
Federal Highway 
Administration 
Annual Highway Statistics Transportation (Y3) 
Federal Bureau of 
Investigation 






Table 8. Variable Definition and Summary Statistics for the First-Stage Estimation 
Variables N Avg. Std. Dev. Min.  Max. 
Cost (C)  
377 2876.4820 1018.5970 1565.5770 8750.4340 
The sum of per capita annual current operation expense and capital 
depreciation (building and equipments, in thousand dollar) 
Education (Y1) 
377 33.3656 6.7645 17.7785 57.6503 
The number of enrolled students in public postsecondary educational 
institutions per thousand population11 
Public Welfare (Y2)  
377 130.2905 43.3478 53.4522 261.7774 
The number of Medicaid recipients per million population (De Borger and 
Kerstens 1996) 
Transportation (Y3)  
377 4155.9530 3768.1730 267.6599 18941.6400 
The length (mile) of state-maintained highways and roads per million 
population (Taylor 1995, Worthington 2000) 
Public Safety (Y4)  
377 37643.8500 9494.6240 18089.3500 63999.0000 
The number of crime incidents per million population (Hoyt 1990, 
Gyourko and Tracy 1991, Davis and Hayes 1993) 
Labor Price (w1)  
377 3662.6640 518.9191 2918.6020 5231.4000 
The monthly total payroll ($) divided by the number of fulltime-
equivalent employees (David and Hayes 1993, Worthing on 2000) 
Capital Price (w2)  
377 5.0030 0.8918 3.0647 8.7823 
The annual interest payments divided by mean debt level (average of 
beginning-of-fiscal-year debt and end-of-fiscal-year debt) (Davis and 
Hayes 1993, Worthington 2000) 
Fiscal year 2001-2008; Annual capital depreciation (part of C) is missing at 23 state-year observations. 
Table 9. Correlation Table for the First-Stage Estimation 
 C Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 w2 
Y1 -0.1507
*      
Y2 0.1734
* 0.0526*     
Y3 0.2106
* 0.3588* 0.0258*    
Y4 -0.1053
* 0.0936* 0.2386* -0.2230*   
w1 0.1801
* -0.3281* -0.1298* -0.5329* -0.2439*  
w2 0.1617
* -0.0797* -0.0366* -0.0869* 0.0870* -0.0178* 
* p < 0.5 in pairwise correlation 
  
                                                
11 Even though primary and secondary (K-12) education is a bigger part of state education system, it is 
largely provided by local governments or school districts, not state governments themselves directly. Thus, 
expenses on K-12 education are not accounted for our cost (C) measure. Since our focus is on the effect of 
IT on state government efficiency, not that of local governments, we choose the higher education 
enrollment for the education measure. 
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For output measures, I choose the four most representative public services U.S. 
state governments supply – education, public welfar, transportation, and public safety. 
Although state governments may provide a wide range of public goods and services, from 
an estimation perspective, it may not be feasible to include all these variables in the 
frontier model. This is because adding more output variables (Yi) to Eq. 1 will lead to 
more regressors and interaction terms, thus decreasing the degrees of freedom. In 
addition, beyond a threshold, I may find collinearity in state output variables, leading to 
other challenges with estimations. Thus, I am faced with a tradeoff in selecting output 
variables to capture the primary objectives of state governments and at the same time 
balancing the number of variables to manage feasibility in estimations. I decided on the 
top four state government outputs rated on the average state expenditure across the states. 
According to State Government Finances Census from the U.S. Census Bureau, the four 
service sectors occupy as much as 65% of the total state general expenditures in fiscal 
year 2008. I selected four proxy variables for each rea as shown in Table 8, following 
prior studies in public economics. I also selected two input price measures in the cost 
function estimation – capital and labor (Table 8). The correlations across the variables are 
presented in Table 9. 
The measures that are used in the second-stage estimation (Eq. 6) are shown in 
Table 10. IT intensity, the key independent variable, is measured by per capita IT budget 
of central IT offices (IT1) and the ratio of IT budget to total general expenditure (IT2). 
These figures were obtained from the NASCIO Compendium of Digital Governments in 
States published in 2003 and 2005. This publication reports IT budget (central IT office 
and executive branches) in more than 40 states fromthe fiscal year 2001 to 2005. 
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However, there are many missing values in executive branch IT budgets12. Thus, I use the 
IT budget of central IT organizations for the IT inte sity measures. IT budget figures are 
available in 193 state-years between 2001 and 2005, but combining them with the sample 
in the first-stage estimation leaves 185 state-year observations. t-tests indicate that with 
respect to population, GDP and total expenditures, the states in the sample do not differ 
significantly from those that are not in the sample. 
The public economics literature provides economic, sociological, and political 
factors affecting technical inefficiency in government administration. Davis and Hayes 
(1993) and Grossman et al. (1999) control for the siz of jurisdiction with population, 
though they do not provide specific prediction regarding the direction of association. 
Geys (2006) argues that per capita income level is related to efficiency. Gey’s study 
claims a positive relationship, arguing that high-income citizens have greater demand for 
more efficient governments. On the other hand, De Borger and Kersten (1996) predict 
that higher income can be a greater tax revenue source, opening a room for inefficiency 
in administration. Therefore, I include household income and per capita GDP as control 
variables in the estimation of Eq. 6 in the second-stage of the estimation. The fiscal 
illusion hypothesis (Geys 2006, Grossman et al. 1999) suggests that as state governments 
become more dependent upon grants from the federal government, more services may be 
provided than needed, and thus inefficiency may increase. This can occur because 
citizens may underestimate the price of public servic s and may demand for more public 
services than would have been demanded without the fed ral support. Hence, I also 
                                                
12 Executive branch IT budgets are available only for about 20 states. Measuring IT intensity with the total 
IT budget in both a central IT organization and executive branches leaves us 98 observations in the second 
stage estimation. The coefficient of IT intensity is not statistically significant. 
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control for per capita federal government grants to each state government in the 
estimation of Eq. 6. 
 
Table 10. Variable Definition and Summary Statistics for the Second-Stage 
Estimation 
Variables N Avg. Std. Dev. Min.  Max. 
TE 
185 -0.2272 0.3128 -2.0250 -0.0145 
The ratio of actual cost to the cost in the frontier 
Population (z1) 
185 5.8545 6.2962 0.5065 35.9903 
Annual state population estimate (in millions) 
Household Income (z2) 
185 46.4493 7.1465 32.6138 65.7097 
State median household income (in thousand dollar) 
GDP (z3) 
185 39.2285 6.2065 26.7714 57.0583 
Per capita state annual gross domestic product (in thousand dollar) 
Federal Grant (z4) 
185 1.4170 0.4356 0.6854 3.6973 
Per capita annual intergovernmental revenues from the federal 
government (in thousand dollar) 
Governor (z5) 
185 0.5405 0.4997 0 1 
1 if governor is Republican, 0 otherwise 
Legislature (z6) 
185 0.9837 0.3195 0.2438 1.6143 
The sum of the proportion of Republican lawmakers in tate senate 
and that of state house of representatives 
IT1  
185 19.8044 17.5104 0.0411 89.2275 
Per capita central IT office budget (in dollar) 
IT2  
185 5.0226 4.5635 0.0139 25.3875 
% of a central IT office budget to total general exp nditure 
Fiscal year 2003-2007 with a two-year lag of IT intensity (2001-2005). 
Table 11. Correlation Table for the Second-Stage Estimation 
 TE z1 z2 z3 z4 z5 z6 IT1 
z1 0.2065*        
z2 -0.3645* 0.0765*       
z3 -0.1591* 0.2811* 0.6479*      
z4 -0.0912* -0.1839* -0.3602* -0.0614*     
z5 -0.1944* 0.0063* 0.1262* 0.0496* -0.0100*    
z6 0.4694* 0.0139* -0.1652* -0.1481* -0.0506* -0.1092*   
IT1 0.1076* -0.2595* -0.1515* 0.0097* 0.1859* 0.1350* 0.2273*  
IT2 0.1608* -0.2025* -0.1586* -0.0222* 0.0400* 0.1134* 0.2453* 0.9594* 
* p < 0.5 in pairwise correlation 
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Next, I include Garand’s (1988) political indicators – governor’s party affiliation, 
and party control of legislatures – because they represent important political and 
institutional factors that may affect state governme t efficiency. I control for state 
geographic location in the second-stage estimation. Geys (2006) discovers a spatial 
pattern in local government efficiency, in which technical inefficiency of a municipality 
is strongly correlated with that of municipalities that share the border, illustrating the 
existence of policy competition and interdependence between neighboring municipalities. 
To account for such an effect, I include eight geographic division variables as shown in 
Column 2 of Table 12. This geographic division is from 2000 U.S. Census. Lastly, I 
include year dummies in the second-stage estimation to account for nation-wide changes 
in economies and political trends. Table 10 and 11 show summary statistics and 
correlations in the second-stage estimation. 
 
Table 12. States in the Sample 
Region Division States 
Northeast 
(1) New England 
Maine(4), New Hampshire(5), Vermont(3), 
Massachusetts(5), Rhode Island(5), Connecticut(3) 
(2) Mid-Atlantic New York(5), Pennsylvania(2), New Jersey(3) 
Midwest 
(3) East North Central Wisconsin(4), Michigan(5), Indiana(3), Ohio(5) 
(4) West North Central 
Missouri(5), North Dakota(5), South Dakota(5), 
Kansas(5), Minnesota(5), Iowa(5) 
South 
(5) South Atlantic 
Maryland(5), Virginia(3), West Virginia(2), North 
Carolina(5), South Carolina(3), Georgia(4), Florida(2) 
(6) East South Central 
Kentucky(5), Tennessee(5), Mississippi(5), 
Alabama(5) 
(7) West South Central Oklahoma(2), Texas(5), Arkansas(5) 
West 
(8) Mountain 
Idaho(5), Montana(5), Wyoming(3), Nevada(5), 
Utah(3), Arizona(5), New Mexico(5) 
(9) Pacific Washington(5), Oregon(3), California(3), Hawaii(5) 
The number in parentheses next to a state is the number of years that the state appears in the sample.  






3.4.1. The Baseline Estimation 
Table 13 shows the results of the first-stage stochastic frontier estimation. Column 
(1) shows the estimation of the cost function without interaction terms. The coefficients 
of the two outputs (public welfare and transportation) and the input prices are positive as 
expected and significant at the 1% level. A negative coefficient of public safety (Y4) 
implies that achieving a lower crime rate requires greater expenditures on public safety13. 
The coefficient of education (Y1) in Column (1) is not significant, but that of (log Y1 log 
Y1) (Column 2) is positive and significant, suggesting the presence of diseconomy of 
scale. The models both with and without interaction terms are significant according to 
Wald statistics, and a log-likelihood test rejects the hypothesis of 0uσ =  in the two 
estimations, indicating the presence of technical inefficiencies in the sample. 
Table 14 presents the second-stage estimation for technical inefficiency with 
exogenous factors (Eq. 6). From the OLS estimation of Eq. 6, I find that both White’s 
general test (greater than 170, significant at the 0.1% level) and Breusch-Pagan test 
(greater than 180, significant at the 0.1% level) dtect the presence of heteroskedasticity. 
To address this issue, I estimate Eq. 6 with White heteroskedasticity-consistent 
estimation. Technical inefficiencies are regressed only on control variables in Column (1). 
The coefficient of population is positive, meaning that states with a larger population 
demonstrate greater cost efficiency. This illustrates a notion of “economy of scale” in 
monitoring government administration (Davis and Hayes 1993). I find that the coefficient 
                                                
13 When using per capita number of inmates in state prisoners for public safety measure (Y4) instead of 
crime rates, the coefficient of Y4 in Column (1) of Table 13 becomes positive and significant, and the 
coefficient of IT intensity (Table 14) is still positive and statistically significant. 
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of household income is negative and significant. This is consistent with the findings in 
prior economic literature on government efficiency (Geys 2006) that a large base on tax 
revenues may become a source of inefficiency. The two political variables offer a 
contrasting result. States in which Republican lawmkers have more control in 
legislatures demonstrate higher cost efficiency, while a Republican governor is associated 
with less cost efficiency. As expected, more federal gr nts are associated with less 
technical efficiency. 
When I include IT intensity variables into the estimation (Column 2 and 3), I find 
that the coefficients of IT intensity are positive and significant at the 5% and 10% level, 
respectively, providing evidence for a significant impact of IT investments on cost 
efficiency. From the coefficient of IT1 (per capita IT budget) and summary statistics in 
Table 8 and 10, I calculate the average contribution of IT investment to cost efficiency of 
state governments in the following way. I first calculate the cost frontier of each of the 
377 observations by dividing the actual cost by the estimated technical inefficiency. For 
example, if the actual cost is $1,500 and the estimated inefficiency is 1.5, the cost frontier 
of this state is $1,000. From this, I can obtain the average cost frontier for all 
observations, which becomes $2,316.34. The coefficint of IT1 in Column (2) of Table 
14 is 0.0018, meaning that all others being equal, a $1 increase in per capita IT budget is 
associated with a 0.18%-point decrease in cost inefficiency, which amounts to $2,316.34 
× 0.0018 = $4.18. This illustrates the potential for a sizeable contribution of IT 
investments to cost savings in U.S. state governments.  
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Table 13. The First-Stage Stochastic Cost Frontier Estimation Results 
Stochastic Frontier Estimation (Dependent Variable: log C) 
Model w/o Interaction Terms Model with Interaction Terms 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
ln Y1 
-0.0195***  
(0.0514)**   ln Y1 
0.7682***  





(0.0261)**   ln Y2 
-26.515***  





(0.0118)**   ln Y3 
-3.7928***  





(0.0335)**   ln Y4 
23.4128***  





(0.0479)**  ln Y1 ln Y1 
0.2176***  





(0.0479)**  ln Y1 ln Y2 
-0.1111** * 





(0.5673)**  ln Y1 ln Y3 
0.0595***  
(0.0636)**  ln w1 ln Y2 
2.1580***  
(0.2936)**  
  ln Y1 ln Y4 
0.2065***  
(0.1408)**  ln w1 ln Y3 
0.3394***  
(0.0951)**  
  ln Y2 ln Y2 
0.0885***  
(0.0528)**  ln w1 ln Y4 
-1.6175***  
(0.2931)**  
  ln Y2 ln Y3 
0.1819***  
(0.0456)**  ln w2 ln Y1 
-0.3640** * 
(0.1766)**  
  ln Y2 ln Y4 
0.2471***  
(0.1214)**  ln w2 ln Y2 
0.0864***  
(0.1573)**  
  ln Y3 ln Y3 
0.0123***  
(0.0140)**  ln w2 ln Y3 
0.0793** * 
(0.0399)**  
  ln Y3 ln Y4 
-0.0746** * 
(0.0612)**  ln w2 ln Y4 
0.1983***  
(0.1333)**  
  ln Y4 ln Y4 
-0.3204***  




















(0.0149)**     
ln L 72.1153***   ln L 194.0932***    
Wald χ2 616.98
***  Wald χ2 2902.38
***    
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01; N = 377; Standard errors are in parentheses;  
1) The variance of idiosyncratic errors (vk,t);  
2) The variance of technial inefficiency terms (uk,t, significance from a log-likelihood test) 
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Table 14. The Second-Stage Estimation Results (Baselin  Estimation) 
Dependent Variable – Technical Efficiency 




























































































































































































































































N  377***   185***   185***  185***  185***  185***  185***  
F  15.71***  5.92***  5.84***  78.56*** 2)  75.75*** 2)  216.5*** 4)  21.96*** 4)  
R2
 
 0.7405***   0.6897***   0.6871***   0.5783 3) 0.5728 3) 61.2670  5) 60.4906 5) 
RMS 0.2083***  0.1840***  0.1848***      
 *p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, #p < 0.1 (one-tail test);  
year dummies are omitted; standard errors are in parentheses;  
1) Geographic division (Table 12); 
 





Even though the first-stage estimation may account for state-specific 
heterogeneity in white error terms (vk,t), I suspect that there are still state-specific factors 
in technical inefficiency that remain unaccounted for. To deal with this concern, I 
estimate Eq. 6 with a random-effect model with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard 
errors, as shown in Columns 4 and 5. The results show t at the coefficients of IT intensity 
are significant at the 5% level, although the magnitude of the coefficients reduces to 
some extent. A Hausman test does not reject the null hypothesis that the random-effect 
estimation does not differ significantly from the estimation with fixed-effect model. Also, 
a Breusch and Pagan Lagrange multiplier test does nt reject the null hypothesis that 
variances of groups in the random-effect model are ze o. 
The fact that technical inefficiency (TE) is bounded below at one may make OLS 
estimation inconsistent, because OLS assumes that observed values of TE can take any 
real value. (Kennedy 2003). To deal with this concer , I re-estimated truncated models 
(Eq. 6) with Tobit regression (Columns 6 and 7 in Table 14). The basic results do not 
change significantly. The coefficient of IT1 (per capita IT budget) is still significant at 
the 10% level, and the sign and significance of other control variables are qualitatively 




Table 15. The Second-Stage Estimation Results with Different Lag Effects 
Dependent Var. – Technical Inefficiency (White Robust Estimation) 




















































































































































N 180***   180***   185***   185***  187***   187***   152***   152***   
F 6.02 ***  5.95***  5.92***  5.84***  6.01***  6.05***  5.76***  5.66***  
R2 0.6961***   0.6945***   0.6897***   0.6871***   0.6802***   0.6797***   0.6921***   0.6902***   
MSE 0.1847***  0.1852***  0.1840***  0.1848***  0.1846***  0.1852***  0.1832***  0.1837** * 
*p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, #p < 0.1 (one-tail test); 
Standard errors are in parentheses.; Geographic and year dummies are omitted. 
 
3.4.2. Robustness Checks 
In this chapter, I conducted a series of sensitivity analyses with alternative 
measures and specifications. So far, in Eq. 6, I have regressed technical efficiency on IT 
intensity with a two-year behind lag. However, I am also interested in seeing how 
different lag effects change the result I have in Table 14. Table 15 shows the estimation 
results with varying lag effects from a one-year to a four-year lag and offers an 
interesting pattern. The significance of IT1 is shown to be at the 5% and 10% level across 
Table 15, and the coefficient of IT2 is marginally significant but consistently positive.  
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I also checked for robustness of the results to the alternative measures for outputs. 
I changed output measures with alternative measures. For example, I estimated Eq. 1 and 
6 with the proportion of primary and secondary public school students to population for 
education variable (Y1) instead of higher education enrollment, with other variables 
unchanged. I find that when employing K-12 enrollment, the coefficient of IT1 variable 
in the second-stage estimation is positive but insignificant, while that of IT2 is still 
significant at the 5% level. I went through a similar process for public welfare (Y2) and 
public safety variables (Y4) and found the results to be consistent.  
I estimated Eq. 1 and 6 with an alternative capital price (w2) as suggested by 
Hardwick (1990). The coefficient of IT2 is positive at the 5%-level significance. Lastly, 
following Garand (1988), I collected the price indexes for government consumption and 
expenditures from Bureau of Economic Accounts and used in calculating real dollar 
terms in order to account for a difference in growth rate between private and public 
sectors. Again, both coefficients of IT intensities are significant. 
I detected several influential observations. First, I find that Alaska and Hawaii 
demonstrate unusually high technical inefficiency (greater than 4σ above mean). This 
explains why the coefficients of geography dummies are significantly positive in Table 
14. I attempted to exclude the two states in estimating Eq. 1. The first-stage estimation 
still rejects the hypothesis of 0uσ =  with the 0.1%-level significance, and the 
coefficients of IT1 and IT2 in the second-stage estimation are positive and significance at 
the 5% and 10% level, respectively. Second, I note that the IT spending figure of 
Delaware is unusually high (greater than 6σ above mean), leading me to exclude the state 
in the baseline estimation (Table 14).  
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In contrast to the two-stage approach, Kumbharkar et al. (1991) and Fenn et al. 
(2008) use a one-stage approach, in which the distribution of uk,t is modeled as a function 
of exogenous factors (z) and one ML estimation generates both the coefficients in Eq. (1) 
and (6). Wang and Schmidt (2002) argue for this one-stage estimation because of 
potentially substantial bias in the two-stage approach. However, in the present research 
setting, the two-stage technique is advocated. First, using the one-stage approach, in 
which IT intensity measure is incorporated in the frontier estimation, limits the number of 
available sample to 185 observations, while the two-stage estimation can utilize all 377 
available. Thus, I can use the two-stage approach to obtain more consistent estimates for 
states’ technical inefficiency. Second, the two-stage approach allows to address the 
endogeneity of IT intensity with 2SLS estimation, which I wil discuss below. 
Furthermore, it permits to account for state-specific factors by estimating the second 
stage with the random-effects model as shown in Columns (4) and (5) of Table 14, an 
approach that is not feasible with the one-stage estimation. For a comparison, however, I 
did estimate the model with the one-stage estimation, and the result appears in Appendix 
4.2. It shows that the coefficient of IT intensity is significant. 
The cost function in Eq. 1 is a total cost function. However, it may be argued that 
on a year by year basis, a variable cost function mdel may be more appropriate. For 
example, Caves et al. (1981) suggest a variable cost function that models a producer 
which minimizes variable costs given the size of fixed capital. The variable cost function 
with n outputs and m input prices can be expressed as 
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where CVk,t and Kk,t are the variable cost and the value of fixed capital, respectively. As 

























+ =∑  for i = 1, 2, …, n (8) 
Since m = 1 (labor) in the current context, Eq. 8 leads to 1 1β =  and 11 0β = . I also 
estimated this variable cost model, and find the results to still hold, although the 
magnitude of IT impact in this model is relatively lower. 
Since the dataset consists of multi-year observations across states, I am able to 
employ a stochastic frontier model with panel data. I dopt a time-invariant stochastic 
frontier model offered by Pitt and Lee (1981), in which uk,t is state-specific uk and follows 
a truncated normal distribution of 2(0, )uN σ
+ . The purpose of this model is that by 
incorporating multiple-years of cost and output information, one can obtain a more 
consistent estimation for technical inefficiency. Using Pitt and Lee’s model does not 
produce a significantly different result. I also estimated the models with the allocative 
and technical inefficiency estimation model of Kumbharkar (1991), and I still find a 
significant relationship between IT intensity and technical efficiency.  
Lastly, in addition to enhancing technical efficiency in the state government 
production, IT may be considered an input factors and substitute for other input factors 
(labor and capital) (Dewan and Min 1997). To account for this effect, I add an IT price 
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variable (w3) and accompanying interaction terms into the cost function (Eq. 1) and re-
estimate the cost frontier. I obtained IT price measures from Producer Price Indexes (PPI, 
Jorgenson 2001) available from Bureau of Labor Statistics14. Table 19 in Appendix 3.2 
shows the first-stage cost frontier estimation with IT price. From this estimate, I re-
estimated technical efficiency of state governments and conducted the second-stage 
estimation as shown in Table 20. The coefficient of IT intensity is still negative and 
marginally significant in the random-effects estimation, although the significance 
decreases to some extent compared to Table 14. 
 So far, I have presented a range of sensitivity analyses with various substitute 
measures for outputs and input prices, and alternative specifications such as the variable 
cost function. These investigations consistently demonstrate a positive relationship 
between IT intensity and technical cost efficiency, onfirming robustness of the findings 
in support of the hypothesis that greater IT investments in U.S. state governments are 
associated with greater administrative efficiency. 
 One might raise a concern of casual relationships in the estimations, specifically 
in the second-step estimation. A positive association between IT intensity and cost 
efficiency (Table 14) may imply that more efficient states are likely to invest more in IT 
than other states. One way this endogeneity is addressed in the literature is through a use 
of lag variables. However, the demand-push hypothesis discussed in Section 2.4.1 
suggests otherwise in that inefficiencies in governme ts may induce demands for IT 
within organizations. However, this demand-push hypothesis does not completely rule 
                                                
14 I obtained Producer Price Index from 2001 to 2008 in the category of Computer and Electronic Product 
Manufacturing (334). We assume that this IT price is common to all state governments, as it is hardly the 




out the endogeneity issue. To address this concern, I estimate Eq. 6 with the two-stage 
least square (2SLS) technique. I use the following variables as instruments – the lagged 
value of IT intensity (ITk,t-3), two variables that represent the IT governance structure in 
state governments15, a variable that measures the centrality of IT management16, and per 
capita IT product shipments in the private sector within the state boundary17. I expect that 
these instrumental variables are correlated with the IT intensity measures but not 
necessarily with cost efficiency measures. For example, the more centralized IT 
management is, the more budgets a central IT organization is likely to have. But, it is 
unlikely that the centrality of IT management is associated with statewide efficiency. 
Likewise, it is expected that states with a bigger IT industry in the private sector are 
likely to invest more in IT, but the size of IT industry is not likely to affect state 
government efficiency. I find that estimating Eq. 6 with 2SLS does not produce a 
substantially different result. 
 
3.4.3. Estimations with Contextual Effects 
In addition to a direct effect of IT investments to c st effijciency, I examine some 
contextual effects. I seek to determine in which context IT investments are most 
associated with administrative efficiency in U.S. state governments. I estimated the 
model in Eq. 6 with interaction terms of three contextual measures including per capita 
GDP size and IT organization factors with IT intensity variables. Table 16 presents the 
                                                
15 NASCIO Compendium provides information on (i) whether a state legislature has IT-related legislative 
committee and (ii) whether a state government has an independent IT department. Two dummy variables 
are used as instrumental variables. 
16 The description for the IT centrality measure is available in Section 3.4.3. 
17  This information is available from Bureau of Economic Accounts. IT product shipments include 
“computer and electronic product manufacturing,” “information and data processing services,” and 
“computer systems design and related services.” 
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estimation result with the three interaction terms. Figure 6 illustrates how the expected 
amount of cost reduction from $1 per capita IT investments changes in per capita state 
GDP, the size of a central IT organization, and the centrality of IT management. 
 Table 16 demonstrates that the interaction term of IT intensity and per capita state 
GDP (IT1×GDP, IT2×GDP) is positive and statistically significant, implying that the 
relationship between IT intensity and efficiency increases with state GDP. This effect 
also exists when I use the private sector GDP (state GDP net of state and local 
government expenditures) in lieu of overall GDP. Furthermore, Figure 6 demonstrates 
that taking the mean value of other variables, the expected amount of cost reduction from 
a $1 IT budget increase is as much as $7.85 if per capita state GDP is $35,000, while it is 
$13.97 when GDP is $40,000. This scale economy in eff ciency gains for larger states 
may be because the contribution of IT investments to administrative efficiency in state 
governments becomes greater in states with larger per capita GDP. States with larger per 
capita GDP are also more likely to be advanced economies relative to other states. This 
finding can be interpreted as follows. First, on the supply side, state governments with a 
larger economy may have access to more advanced, sophisticated technologies as well as 
to a better pool of talent. Second, on the demand side, given that state governments with 
larger GDP are more likely to have complex administrative processes, the potential 
automate and informate effects of IT discussed earlier may be higher. That is, these states 
may have more opportunities to realize benefits from automation and integration enabled 
by IT investments. This result is also in accordance with a country level study of Dewan 
and Kraemer (2002), who find that return on IT investments is greater in developed 
countries than in developing countries. 
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Table 16. The Second-Stage Estimation Results with Interaction Terms 
Dependent Variable – Technical Efficiency 
Method White Robust Estimation 















































IT1 × GDP 0.0005
** * 
(0.0002)**   
IT1 × IT-EMP 
-0.0005***  
(0.0001)**   
IT1 × MGT 
0.0012***  
(0.0003)**   
IT2 × GDP  
0.0019***  
(0.0010)**  
IT2 × IT-EMP  
-0.0018** * 
(0.0008)**  








F  6.35***  5.86***  
R2
 
 0.7236***   0.7142***   
RMS 0.1763***  0.1793***  
 *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01; N = 185;  
Year and geograpic dummies are omitted; Standard errors are in parentheses;  
1) The percentage of a central IT organization staff to total state employees; 
 2) The number of IT management areas that a state CIO directly is in charge of (max = 13) 
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Figure 6. The Impact of Per Capita GDP, Size of IT Staff, and Centrality of IT 
Management on Cost Efficiency Effect of IT Investments 
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Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Mean values of per capita GDP, IT staff, and, and 




 The data from NASCIO also provides additional information on IT organization 
in state governments. Specifically, I use information on the size of a central IT 
organization that a state CIO directly oversees andits statewide IT management 
responsibilities. The NASCIO Compendium publishes the headcount of a central IT staff 
and the number of IT management areas that a state CIO is in charge of among thirteen 
areas such as IT architecture or IT training. Table 16 shows that the coefficient of IT 
intensity and the size of IT function (measured by the ratio of central IT staff to total state 
employees) (IT1×IT-EMP, IT2×IT-EMP) is negative and significant. This indicates that 
the relationship between IT intensity and cost efficiency decreases with the size of a 
central IT organization. Figure 6 demonstrates that t e expected amount of cost reduction 
is as much as $12.53 if the size of central IT functio  is 0.5%, while it is $6.62 when its 
size is 1%. 
In contrast, I find that the relationship between IT intensity and efficiency 
increases with the centrality of IT management, which is measured by the number of 
statewide IT management area a state CIO is responsible for. Table 16 shows that the 
coefficient of IT intensity and the centrality of IT management (IT1×MGT, IT2×MGT) is 
positive and significant. Figure 6 demonstrates that when a central IT function is in 
charge of 20% of the IT management areas, the expected cost reduction is $4.76, while it 
increases to $12.04 if the centrality is 40%. This finding suggests that as state executive 
branches and agencies assume more responsibilities in IT management, thereby 
decentralizing the IT function, the efficiency effect of IT investments diminishes. This 
finding is also consistent with the literature on IT governance, which argues that a 
centralized IT governance mode is likely to be adopted in an organization which seeks 
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cost-effective use of IT (Weill and Ross 2004) and i ter-business unit synergies 
(Tanriverdi 2006, Gu et al. 2008). Nonetheless, my finding suggests that such a benefit 
from centralized IT management is likely to diminish with an increase in the size of 
central IT organization. The result suggests that te association between IT investments 
and cost efficiency is greatest when a central IT organization manages state-wide IT 
operations with less staff.  
 
3.5. Discussions and Conclusion 
 
I believe that the findings of this study provide significant implications for policy 
makers, managers and government officials. A key finding of the study is that more IT 
spending is associated with greater administrative efficiency in U.S. governments. The 
empirical model and choice of measures are drawn from the literature on public 
economics, and the baseline estimation as well as a r nge of sensitivity analyses offers 
strong support to the main hypothesis. In addition, according to my estimation, the 
relationship between IT intensity and cost efficieny endures over a period of years. I 
also find that the efficiency effect of IT investments increases with per capita state GDP 
and the centrality of IT management, while it decreases with the size of a central IT 
office. 
The analysis so far has indicated that every $1 additional investments on the 
average can lead to approximately $4.18 in cost effici ncy benefits. This order of savings 
is not unprecedented in real projects. For example, as discussed earlier, for the central HR 
system deployed by the State of Michigan, the total investment in the project by the State 
103  
 
was $4.6 million, while the state estimates up to $28 million direct savings from a HR 
staff reduction in the 5-year period (State of Michigan 2007). This saving estimate does 
not account for benefits and productivity improvements of the entire state employees 
from efficient HR operations. Similarly the online tuition assistance program by the State 
of New York (e-TAP) discussed earlier retuned in cost savings over three times the 
investments in the IT application (NASCIO 2006b).   
This study provides a meaningful managerial implication to elective officials and 
managers in the public sector. It is reported that due to budget shortfalls prevalent in 
many state and local governments across the U.S. in recent years, IT budgets have 
become an early target for budgetary cuts. A survey conducted by the Public Technology 
Institute and Input in 2010 reports that IT budgets of 50% of the local governments are 
expected to be cut in order to close government-wide budget caps (Government 
Technology 2010). Likewise, an NASCIO report shows that 64% of the state CIOs 
expect to face a decline in IT budgets in fiscal years 2011 to 2013 (NASCIO 2010). 
These reports deliver a concern of IT managers that such reductions in IT investments 
may in fact jeopardize the efforts to improve the effici ncy of government administration 
in the long run. The result of our study confirms their concern and suggests that 
governments rather need to leverage information technologies as a tool to overcome 
fiscal crises.  
The major contribution of this study to the research literature is to explore the 
performance impact of IT in the public sector. Not only does the public sector continue to 
grow, but its significance over the entire economy cannot be underestimated. 
Furthermore, as in the private sector, the size of IT spending in the public sector 
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organizations is significant. Given the emerging technologies and pervasive nature of IT 
in every aspect of governments, IT is expected to play a wider role in improving and 
innovating administrative processes and public servic  delivery. Hence, it is imperative 
for policy makers to understand the impact of IT investment on the efficiency of public 
organizations. However, to the best of my knowledge, few quantitative empirical studies 
have addressed this role of IT in a scientific and rigorous manner. I believe that this study 
fills this gap in the literature and offers substantive evidence that IT can create value even 
in the absence of profit motives and competitive prssures, a new insight for IT business 
value researchers. 
Also, I introduce a different empirical approach to measure the value creation 
effect of IT in the public sector. Based on my understanding of the differences between 
the private and the public sector, I believe that the cost function framework is more 
suitable than the production function, a de facto approach in the IT value studies in the IS 
literature. Considering that my interest lies in whether IT improves the overall efficiency 
in government administration, and there is no straightforward way to measure overall 
productivity in the context, I find that the multi-product translog cost function is more 
useful in my study. Moreover, I find that it is appro riate to regard the amount of public 
service outputs as exogenously given and to consider IT a factor that improves efficiency 
in producing such outputs. It is my belief that this approach is useful in other not-for-
profit contexts such as healthcare or education. This provides opportunities for future 
research. I also believe, however, that there is an opportunity for adopting the production 
framework to study the performance impact of IT in specific public service areas where it 
is possible to focus on a specific output that can be measured in a quantitative term. 
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There is no doubt, however, that the present study is not without limitations. First, 
this study shares the weaknesses of stochastic frontie  estimation. For example, the 
frontier model is sometimes prone to specification errors (Lovwell 1993). I cannot ensure 
that the specifications are free from such errors, even though I employed several 
alternative specifications in the estimations. Also, the estimate for individual technical 
inefficiency by Battese and Coelli (1988) is not consistent measures (Kumbharkar and 
Lovell 2000). Another limitation of the estimation approach is that exogenous factors I 
identified to have an impact on efficiency in the scond-stage estimation may be 
correlated with output and input price measures in the first-stage estimation, possibly 
causing biases in the coefficients I get. I addressed some of these concerns in Section 4.2, 
but I still cannot completely rule out any possibility of biases. While I believe my 
analyses control for almost all of the significant, but unobserved state heterogeneities that 
may affect the cost (in Eq. 1) or the technical efficiency (in Eq. 6), it is always possible 
that some additional sources of heterogeneity remain unaccounted for. Third, the 
estimation in the present study does not account for the quality of services state 
governments offer. Therefore, I cannot rule out the possibility that IT investments reduce 
costs by deteriorating the quality of services. Future research may study how IT 
investments affect the quality of public services. Finally, even though the focus is on the 
efficiency of overall state administration, the IT intensity measures only include IT 
budgets of central IT functions, not of all other executive branches, the latter of which I 
was able to access in only a few states. Thus, it might be the case that the effect is either 
under- or over-estimated in this study. 
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Since this is one of the few studies for IT value in the public sector, there are 
numerous ways to extend this study. First, this study can be replicated in other contexts 
such as municipal or federal governments, or other public organizations. It would be also 
interesting to study IT value impact in the international context. Second, in the present 
study, I have focused on the cost efficiency effect of IT in state governments via the 
automate and informate role of IT, because they are the most primary strategic roles of IT 
and can be measured quantitatively in a more straightforward manner. However, it is also 
a significant issue to see whether IT plays a transform role in public organizations. I 
expect that IT will transform public organizations from bureaucratic, silo organizations to 
leaner, more transparent, and agile organizations with tighter coordination between 
agencies and rapid, timely responses to public needs. Future research can explore this 




Appendix 3.1. Description of Measures 
 
Total Cost (C) – Current Operation Expense 
From State Government Finance published by the U.S.Census Bureau, we took current 
operation expense, divided it by annual population estimate, and adjusted it for 2005 
dollar with the price index for GDP provided by the Bureau of Economic Accounts. 
 
Total Cost (C) – Capital Depreciation  
We referred to ‘Notes to Financial Statements’ section in states’ comprehensive annual 
financial reports (CAFR) to obtain annual capital depreciation. Among several capital 
asset categories, only buildings and equipments and related asset categories such as 
fixtures or vehicles were considered, as states have discretion in reporting the 
depreciation of other types of capital assets. For example, some states categorize 
infrastructure as depreciable assets, while others consider it non-depreciable. Also, we 
include the asset of primary governments and exclude that of discretely presented 
component units, since many states do not report the capital figure of such units. Per 
capita capital depreciation was calculated and adjusted for 2005 dollar. 
 
Labor Price (w1) 
State Government Employment & Payroll data published by the U.S. Census Bureau 
contains the monthly payroll for full-time and part-time staff employed by state 
governments. We took the sum of full-time and part-time payroll and divided it by the 




Capital Price (w2) 
From State Government Finances, “interest on general d bt” was divided by mean debt 




From State Higher Education Finance Survey, the number of students enrolled in public 
post-secondary educational institutions was divided by population estimate. 
 
Public Welfare (Y2) 
From Medicaid Summary Table provided by the Center for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services, the enrollee population was divided by population estimate. 
 
Transportation (Y3) 
From Highway Statistics published by the Federal Highway Administration, we took the 
length (miles) of rural and urban roads owned and maintained by state highway agency 
and divided it by population estimate. 
 
Public Safety (Y4) 
From crime statistics provided by the Federal Burea of Investigation, we divided the 




IT Intensity (IT1 and IT2) 
2002 NASCIO Compendium of Digital Governments in States provides the actual IT 
budget figure in 2001 and 2002, and the expected budget in 2003. 2004 Compendium 
covers the actual budget in 2003 and 2004, and the expected budget in 2005. The 
correlation between the expected 2003 budget in 2002 Compendium and the actual 2003 
budget in 2004 Compendium is 0.66. We took the actual 2003 budget from 2004 
Compendium and if it is missing, took the expected bu get from 2002 Compendium.  
IT1 was calculated by dividing IT budget by population estimate. IT2 was derived by 
dividing IT budget by “general expenditure” from State Government Finances. 
 
Federal Grant (z4) 
From State Government Finances, “intergovernmental revenue from federal government” 
was divided by population estimate. 
 
Party Control of Legislatures (z6) 
We calculated the ratio of Republican state representatives in state house and Republican 
state senator in senate, respectively and took the sum of two. For Nebraska, which has a 




Appendix 3.2. Additional Estimation Results 
 
Table 17. Kumbharkar et al. (1991) One-Stage Estimation with Per Capita IT 
Budget 
Stochastic Frontier Estimation (Dependent Variable: log C) 
Cost Function Estimation Estimation for Inefficiency 
ln Y1 
21.2789***  
(3.7286)**  ln w1 
1.9762***  





(2.7066)**  ln w2 
-0.9762***  





(1.0601)**  ln w1 ln w1 
-0.0163***  












ln Y1 ln Y1 
-0.3525***  
(0.2000)**  ln w1 ln w2 
-0.0156***  
(0.1162)**  Governor 
0.2955***  
(0.4966)**  
ln Y1 ln Y2 
-0.2970***  
(0.1612)**  ln w1 ln Y1 
-0.3108***  
(0.3313)**  Legislature 
-3.8691***  
(0.7402)**  
ln Y1 ln Y3 
-0.0467***  
(0.0795)**  ln w1 ln Y2 
0.7167***  
(0.2382)**  IT1 
-0.0514***  
(0.0182)**  
ln Y1 ln Y4 
-0.5744***  
(0.1406)**  ln w1 ln Y3 
0.0913***  
(0.0984)**  const. 
-1.4075***  
(2.1845)**  
ln Y2 ln Y2 
-0.0903** * 
(0.0755)**  ln w1 ln Y4 
-0.4972***  
(0.3116)**    
ln Y2 ln Y3 
0.0054***  
(0.0435)**  ln w2 ln Y1 
-0.3786** * 
(0.1817)**    
ln Y2 ln Y4 
0.0588***  
(0.1136)**  ln w2 ln Y2 
0.1981***  
(0.1820)**    
ln Y3 ln Y3 
0.0380***  
(0.0143)**  ln w2 ln Y3 
0.0834***  
(0.0581)**    
ln Y3 ln Y4 
0.0511** * 
(0.0463)**  ln w2 ln Y4 
0.0970***  
(0.1269)**    
ln Y4 ln Y4 
0.0288***  
(0.0842)**  const. 
-43.4855***  





(0.0012)**   ln L 224.8630
***  Wald χ2 4077.13
***  
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01; N = 185; Standard errors are in parentheses;  
Geographic and year dummies are omitted; 1) The variance of idiosyncratic errors (vk,t);  
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Table 18. Kumbharkar et al. (1991) One-Stage Estimation with the Ratio of IT 
Budget 
Stochastic Frontier Estimation (Dependent Variable: log C) 
Cost Function Estimation Estimation for Inefficiency 
ln Y1 
20.6235***  
(3.6896)**  ln w1 
1.8269***  





(2.7370)**  ln w2 
-0.8269***  





(1.0926)**  ln w1 ln w1 
-0.0097***  












ln Y1 ln Y1 
-0.3647***  
(0.2035)**  ln w1 ln w2 
-0.0242***  
(0.1145)**  Governor 
0.3883***  
(0.5223)**  
ln Y1 ln Y2 
-0.3040***  
(0.1669)**  ln w1 ln Y1 
-0.2286***  
(0.3297)**  Legislature 
-3.8757***  
(0.7846)**  
ln Y1 ln Y3 
-0.0423***  
(0.0807)**  ln w1 ln Y2 
0.6259***  
(0.2395)**  IT1 
-0.2285***  
(0.0767)**  
ln Y1 ln Y4 
-0.5669***  
(0.1424)**  ln w1 ln Y3 
0.0581***  
(0.1008)**  const. 
-0.8244***  
(2.3278)**  
ln Y2 ln Y2 
-0.0867** * 
(0.0724)**  ln w1 ln Y4 
-0.4555***  
(0.3090)**    
ln Y2 ln Y3 
0.0022***  
(0.0441)**  ln w2 ln Y1 
-0.3627***  
(0.1874)**    
ln Y2 ln Y4 
0.0502***  
(0.1146)**  ln w2 ln Y2 
0.2004***  
(0.1870)**    
ln Y3 ln Y3 
0.0359***  
(0.0145)**  ln w2 ln Y3 
0.0673***  
(0.0614)**    
ln Y3 ln Y4 
0.0465** * 
(0.0472)**  ln w2 ln Y4 
0.0950***  
(0.1299)**    
ln Y4 ln Y4 
0.0252***  
(0.0854)**  const. 
-45.0117***  





(0.0043)**   ln L 250.7070
***  Wald χ2 4121.09
***  
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01; N = 185; Standard errors are in parentheses;  





Table 19. The First-Stage Cost Frontier Estimation with IT Price 
Stochastic Frontier Estimation (Dependent Variable: log C) 
ln Y1 
28.4165***  
(9.2435)**  ln w1 
-5.2605** * 





(4.7073)**  ln w2 
0.6922***  





(2.2619)**  ln w3 
5.5683***  





(5.5893)**  ln w1 ln w1 
0.7063***  
(0.2186)**  ln w2 ln Y4 
0.7006***  
(0.2148)**  
ln Y1 ln Y1 
0.1984***  
(0.2282)**  ln w2 ln w2 
0.1671***  
(0.1815)**  ln w3 ln Y1 
-0.0644***  
(0.1750)**  
ln Y1 ln Y2 
-0.4045***  
(0.1397)**  ln w3 ln w3 
-0.1977** * 
(0.1715)**  ln w3 ln Y2 
-0.0333***  
(0.1131)**  
ln Y1 ln Y3 
-0.3570***  
(0.0864)**  ln w1 ln w2 
0.0699***  
(0.3750)**  ln w3 ln Y3 
-0.0012***  
(0.0670)**  
ln Y1 ln Y4 
-0.0605***  
(0.2144)**  ln w1 ln w3 
-0.1327***  
(0.3459)**  ln w3 ln Y4 
0.0989***  
(0.1600)**  
ln Y2 ln Y2 
0.0662***  
(0.0692)**  ln w2 ln w3 
-0.6130** * 
(0.2571)**  const. 
-57.1823***  
(35.4721)**  
ln Y2 ln Y3 
0.4230***  






ln Y2 ln Y4 
0.7651***  






ln Y3 ln Y3 
0.0787***  
(0.0254)**  ln w1 ln Y3 
1.3778***  
(0.2093)**  ln L 181.2084 
ln Y3 ln Y4 
0.1017***  
(0.0808)**  ln w1 ln Y4 
-0.0527***  
(0.4539)**  Wald χ2 1267.02 
ln Y4 ln Y4 
-0.2907***  
(0.1514)**      
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01; N = 377; Standard errors are in parentheses;  
1) The variance of idiosyncratic errors (vk,t);  
2) The variance of technial inefficiency terms (uk,t, significance from a log-likelihood test) 
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Table 20. The Second Stage Estimation with IT Price 
Dependent Variable – Technical Efficiency 
Method White Robust Estimation Random-Effects Estimation 













































































F  9.88***  9.81***  68.56*** 1)  67.63*** 1)  
R2
 
 0.6434***   0.6418***   0.6084 2) 0.6046 2) 
RMS 0.1032***  0.1034***    
 *p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, #p < 0.1 (one-tail test); N=185 
Geographic and year dummies are omitted; standard errors are in parentheses;  
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CHAPTER 4.  
DO INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS LEAD TO BIGGER OR 





Since the nineteenth century, public economists and political scientists have long 
been interested in the growth of governments (Larkey et al. 1981). Witnessing a 
significant growth in governments over the recent several decades and concomitant 
frustration of the general public with ‘big governments,’ numerous researchers have 
studied why governments continue to grow. Inquires have examined a variety of 
questions including which factors cause governments to grow; under what mechanisms 
government expenditures are determined; and what impact government growth has upon 
the overall economy. The literature on this issue is so wide and extensive that Lybeck 
(1988) classified the literature into twelve theoris, and Tarschys (1975) suggested nine 
broad categories and 25 explanations for government growth, although both authors 
admit that their coverage is by no means exhaustive. 
One of the key factors behind government growth identifi d by this literature is 
technological development (Tarschys 1975, North 1985). Specifically, the industrial 
revolution fueled by technological advances and accompanying societal changes such as 
urbanization have led governments to expand their influence on the economy. Against 
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this backdrop, I propose another technological factor that may influence the growth of 
governments in the post-industrial era – information technology (IT). In this chapter, I 
aim at exploring whether IT investments made by governments can change or keep the 
course of government growth. 
The relationship between IT investments and organization size in the for-profit 
context is among the key research interests in the information systems (IS) literature. For 
example, an industry-level analysis by Brynjolfsson et al. (1994) shows that the level of 
industry IT stock is related to a smaller size of firms as measured by the number of 
employees, sales, and value added per establishment. Also in an industry-level study, 
Wood et al. (2008) find that the relationship varies across the industry sectors; IT 
investments are associated with smaller firm size in manufacturing industries and with 
larger firm size in retail and service industries. One of the few studies at the 
organizational level, Hitt (1999) finds that increas d use of IT is associated with an 
increase in vertical integration and a decrease in diversification. However, few studies, if 
any, in IS and public economics paid much attention o the effect of IT investments on 
government size. In a study for the transportation industry, Baker and Hubbard (2004) 
find that adoption of onboard computers (OBC) in trucks is associated with an increase in 
asset (truck) ownership by shippers and a decrease in ownership by independent drivers 
(contractors). They suggest that the adoption of OBC reduces a shipper’s monitoring 
costs of driving records, making it more attractive for the shipper to own trucks compared 
to contracting with independent drivers who own trucks. 
To fill this gap, I offer theoretical arguments and empirical evidence regarding the 
role of IT in government growth at the context of U.S. state governments. Based on the 
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three theoretical models from political science and public economics literature (Fiorina 
and Noll 1978, Becker 1983, Banks 1989), I give four explanations for the impact of IT 
on government growth. First, on the supply side, automating manual, labor-intensive 
administrative processes enables governments to produce public goods and services with 
a smaller amount of input. In other words, IT improves the productivity of public good 
production (Brynjolffson and Hitt 1996, Dewan and Kraemer 2000). Consequently, IT 
investments can be expected to lead to smaller governments, provided that the demand of 
public goods remains unchanged. Second, more digitalized, transparent administrative 
processes and increased availability of information on governments’ actions and decision 
making alleviate the information asymmetry problem between principals (voters and 
legislatures) and agents (bureaucrats) (Horn 1995). This effect can make the monitoring 
activities of legislatures (Bendor et al. 1985, Banks 1989) more effective and thereby 
curb the power of bureaucrats, which may lead to excessive government expenditures 
(Niskanen 1968, Miller and Joe 1983).  
On the demand side, enhanced communication between citizens and government 
officials promoted by e-Government initiatives (West 2004) helps citizens and interest 
groups become well-informed about government administrat on, facilitating their 
monitoring role on governments. In turn, this further assists the checks-and-balances 
mechanism of legislatures (Banks and Weingast 1992), again leading to smaller 
governments. Finally, more efficient production of public goods and more effective 
administrative processes may reduce the price of public goods. A reduction in tax price 
may increase the demand for public goods and lead to the expansion of governments. 
These contrasting arguments pose a significant challenge in predicting how IT affects the 
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size of governments. Instead of making a specific prediction, therefore, I offer two 
competing hypotheses that greater use of IT and digitization in governments either 
expands or shrinks government expenditures. 
Next, adopting the state government growth model proposed by Garand (1988, 
1989) as an empirical framework, I examine the effects of IT investments in the context 
of U.S. state governments. I utilize data from a variety of sources. I obtained the 5-year 
data on IT expenditures and IT organizations in state governments from the NASCIO 
Compendium of Digital Governments in the States. I also gathered data on state 
expenditure, tax revenue, payroll and so forth from the U.S. Census Bureau. The primary 
independent variable in the empirical analyses is IT intensity (Bharawaj et al. 1999, 
Anderson et al. 2006), which is measured in two ways – the ratio of IT budget to state 
gross domestic product (GDP), and per capita IT budget. I choose the proportion of 
annual expenditures to state GDP, one of the common easures of government size in 
the public economics literature (e.g. Lowery and Berry 1983, Borcherding 1985, 
Saunders 1993), as a dependent variable. I build a 5-year unbalance panel consisting of 
190 observations in 44 states. 
The empirical analysis confirms the hypothesis thatmore IT investments in state 
governments are associated with smaller government size. Estimations with the dynamic 
panel-data model provided by Blundell and Bond (1998) find a negative relationship 
between IT intensity and state government expenditures at the 1%-level of significance. 
Specifically, the result shows that if the proportin of IT budget to state GDP increases 
by one percentage point, the ratio of state expenditures to GDP decreases by 
approximately 3.49 percentage points. In a numeric t m, a $1 increase in per capita IT 
124  
 
budget is associated with as much as $3.68 a reduction in per capita general expenditures. 
I also find that this pattern is consistent with a use of different measures for government 
size, alternative functional specifications, and estimation techniques. 
This work contributes to the IS and public economics l terature by suggesting a 
new technological factor for government expenditures. This study is also among few 
studies that examine the relationship between IT spending and organization size, 
especially at the organizational level, compared to industry-level studies (Brynjolfsson et 
al. 1994, Woods et al. 2008). 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The subsequent section 
offers a theoretical discussion and develops the hypot eses. Section 4.3 describes data 
sources, measures, and methodology. In Section 4.4, the results from empirical 
investigations are presented. The chapter concludes with discussions, limitations, and 
future research directions. 
 
4.2. Theoretical Development 
 
 This section provides the theoretical arguments regarding the relationship 
between IT investments and government size. I draw on three theoretical models on 





4.2.1. The Production of Public Goods with Legislative Facilitation Model 
 Fiorina and Noll (1978) provide a public good production model that incorporates 
bureaucracy costs and legislative facilitation servic s. In their model, to request the 
production of public goods that they desire, citizens may incur an external cost in dealing 
with bureaucrats, and this external cost can be reduced by legislators who offer 
facilitation services. Among such external costs are those associated with discovering the 
appropriate entry point to the bureaucrats, with communicating with the bureaucrats, and 
with sending information on the public good demand to the bureaucrats. In facilitation 
services, legislators provide constituents with a support in dealing with the bureaucrats18. 
 In a formal model, there are m districts, each of which n voters reside in. Each 
district is represented by a legislator. A voter is endowed with income yij ( 1,...,i n= , 
1,...,j m= ), where i and j indicates a voter and a district, respectively. She consumes the 
private good zij and the public good K produced by a government agency. Her utility 
function is given by ( , )ij ijU z K . She pays a tax tij and incurs the external bureaucracy cost 
( , )ijC B F , where B is the size of the agency and Fij indicates the amount of facilitation 
services offered by the legislator who represents the district j. C is increasing in B and 
decreasing in Fij. Thus, the voter’s budget constraint is given by, 
  ( , )ij ij ij ijy z t C B F= + +        (9)  
 The production of public good K requires two inputs – the agency B and other 
inputs X. The prices of the two inputs are PB and PX, respectively, and the production 
function is given by ( , )f B X . The purchase of the two inputs is appropriated to by tax 
                                                
18 Fiorina and Noll (1978) state that “the oversight function of the legislature give it (the legislature) 
influence with bureaucrats and information on how the bureaucracy works, both of which are potentially of 
value to citizens who come in contact with the agency” (p. 241). 
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revenue. In addition, part of the tax revenue is spent in generating facilitation services, 
whose price is Pf. Therefore, the tax revenue must be equivalent to the sum of the 
purchase of inputs and facilitation services as follows. 
  
, ,
ij B X f ij
i j i j
t P B P B P F= + +∑ ∑       (10) 
 Fiorina and Noll (1978) solve three maximization problems in their work, 
depending on who a decision maker is – a social welfare maximization problem; a 
decentralization decision problem which maximizes the median voter’s welfare19; and a 
budget maximization problem in which bureaucrats are interested in maximizing budget. 
For example, the social welfare maximization problem is given by 
  max 
,
( , )ij ij
i j
U z K∑        (11) 
  subject to ( , )K f B X=       (12) 
       




ij ij ij ij
i j i j i j i j
ij ij B X f ij
i j i j i j
y z C B F t
z C B F P B P X P F
= + +
= + + + +
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑
  (13) 
by Eq. 10. 
With respect to the effects of IT in the context of the above problem, some 
implications can be derived. First, as predicted by the literature of IT business value, the 
use of IT will improve the productivity of public good production. This implies that given 
the amount of public goods K to be produced, the use of inputs B and X can be reduced. 
Thus, as long as K remains unchanged, the budget size B XP B P X+  may decrease in IT 
investments.  
                                                
19 Median voter theory dictates that when political inclination of voters can be described by a horizontal 
line and two political parties compete for political support, a median voter, who resides in the center of the 
horizontal line, is a decisive voter. This implies that the demand of such a median voter becomes a 
representative demand for a whole constituency. 
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Second, the use of IT and the Internet may decrease the bureaucracy cost C. An 
example is TampaGov Customer Service Center in Tampa, Florida (Cantler 2007). This 
Web site provides citizens with a one-point contact point to city-wide agencies and 
departments. Among other tools, it features a communication tool for submitting service 
requests and inquiries, a self-service payment system for utility and tax, and a self-service 
public records search tool. Each inquiry or request submitted to the system is 
automatically re-directed to city officials who are in charge of it, and a requestor can 
track the processing progress with a unique tracking number on this site. This example 
illustrates that automated administrative processes and online communication with 
citizens assist constituents in dealing with the agncies. Consequently, IT investments 
may lead to a reduction in C, which in turn may increase the citizens’ willingness to pay 
(tij) for the public goods, as given by Eq. 9. Therefor, it can be expected that a reduction 
in C may lead to an increase in the budget size B XP B P X+ . 
 
4.2.2. Political Control of Bureaucracy Model 
 Banks (1989) proposes a political control model of bureaucracy in the presence of 
information asymmetry and conflicts of interests. His work models a budget decision 
game between a legislature and a bureaucratic agency. The legislature has an authority to 
approve the budget proposed by the agency, but has limited information on the actual 
cost of administration. The agency is interested in maximizing the budget size (b), while 
the legislature’s interest is to maximize the benefit to voters net of the budget (v b− ). 
 In his model, the benefit of a certain public good is v and is known to both the 
legislature and the agency. On the other hand, the cost of production c is known only to 
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the agency, while the legislature is only aware of the distribution of the cost, ( )f c . The 
budget decision game proceeds as follows. Discovering the true cost c, the agency 
submits a budget request b to the legislature. The legislature has three options. With a 
probability of α1, it accepts this budget request. With a probability of α2, it conducts an 
audit with a cost of k and discovers the true value of c. The budget size becomes c after 
the audit. With a probability of 1 21 α α− − , the legislature rejects the budget request. 
Banks (1989) derives the sequential equilibrium strategies of the legislature and the 
agency as follows. 
 
 If *k k< , where k* is the solution of 
0 0
( ) ( )
v v
c f c dc f c dc v k⋅ = −∫ ∫ , (14)  
 The size of the budget request is*
if [0, ']
( )
if ( ', ]
c k c c
b c
v c c v
+ ∈
=  ∈
  (15)  
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b k
k b k b k k c
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b k c v
k c k v c b v
α
<
 − ∈ +=  ∈ +
 − − =
   (16)  
 The legislature audits the request with a probability of * *2 1( ) 1 ( )b bα α= −  (17)  
 where c’ is the solution of 
' '
( ) ( )
v v
c c
c f c dc f c dc v k⋅ = −∫ ∫  
 If *k k> , * ( )b c v= , *1 ( ) 1bα = , and 
*
2( ) 0bα = .    (18)  
 
According to this equilibrium, the auditing is too c stly (if *k k> ), the legislature has no 
incentive to audit the budget request and thus accepts any budget request. Also, if *k k<  
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and c is sufficiently low ( 'c c< ), the agency reveals its true cost. Under the equilibri m 
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( , , ) if and ( ', ]
'
if
c k c k k k c c
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B v c k c k k c c v
v c
v k k
 + − < ∈
 − −= + < ∈ −
>
  (19)  
 Based on this model, a prediction can be made regarding the impact of IT 
investments on the expenditure size. First, automati n and digitization by IT systems in 
production processes brings a reduction in the production cost c. Second, even though the 
legislature cannot observe the true cost c, it can still expect the cost reduction from IT 
investments. Therefore, the legislature’s prior cost di tribution ( )f c  is shifted to the left20. 
This shift in turn increases both k*, so that the auditing becomes more feasible (Eq. 14). 
Third, digitized administration processes can collect most information regarding costs 
and decision making, enabling the legislature to conduct an audit with a less cost. Thus, 
IT investments may lead to a smaller k. All these three effects contribute to a decline i 
the expected budget ( , , )B v c k . Appendix 4.2 provides a proof for this proposition. 
 Continuing his work, Banks and Weingast (1992) explain the role of constituency 
and pressure groups in this model. They argue that “politicians cannot hope to monitor 
hundreds of agencies by themselves and instead rely on their constituents to do so” (p. 
519). Thus, constituents who are organized and well-informed about agencies’ 
administration can contribute to a reduction in the auditing cost k by “conveying relevant 
information to politicians” (p. 519). Once again, digitized administrative processes can 
facilitate constituency’s monitoring activities, leading to a reduction in k and thereby the 
                                                








budget size ( , , )B v c k . For instance, the National Taxpayers Union was able to discover 
illegitimate expenditures in State of Missouri agenci s via the Missouri Accountability 
Portal (http://mapyourtaxes.mo.gov) (Government Technology 2008a). This Web site 
publishes comprehensive financial records of the state agencies on a daily basis. This 
database helps both citizens and legislatures monitor bureaucrats’ activities and curb their 
unnecessary use of tax revenue. The City of New York also operates a similar Web site 
called NYCStat (http://www.nyc.gov/html/ops/nycstat/) that posts a variety of 
information related to city-wide services, including city agency performance records and 
customer satisfaction reports (Public CIO 2009). In sum, the model of Banks (1989) and 
Banks and Weingast (1992) provides a prediction that more IT investments in 
governments are associated with a smaller size of government expenditures. 
 
4.2.3. Pressure Group Competition Model 
 Becker (1983) presents a model of competition among pressure groups for 
political influence. He asserts that “individuals belong to particular groups that are 
assumed to use political influence to enhance the well-being of their members, and 
competition among these pressure groups for political influence determines the 
equilibrium structure of taxes, subsidies and other political factors.” (p. 372) In this 
regard, he models how political influences21 exercised by pressure groups determine the 
size of income redistribution, one of the primary role of governments (Stiglitz 2000) and 
how group size and efficiency of influence activities affect on the size of redistribution. 
                                                




 His analytic model considers two pressure groups – taxpayers (t) and recipients 
(s). The population of two groups is nt and ns, respectively. Each taxpayer pays Rt, while 
each recipient receives a subsidy of Rs. The total size of subsidy is governed by the 
following function. 
( ) ( )t t s sn F R S n G R= =       (20)  
Here, F represents a tax collection function. In the model, ( )t tF R R≤ , ' 1F ≤ , and '' 0F ≤ , 
indicating the presence of deadweight costs in tax collection. By the same token, G refers 
to a redistribution function, and ( )s sG R R≥ , ' 1G ≥ , and '' 0G ≥ , again representing the 
deadweight costs in distribution. The two pressure groups exercise political influence It 
and Is, respectively, and both Rt and Rs are functions of It and Is. In turn, It and Is are 
determined by the size of corresponding groups (nt and ns) and the amount of resources 
(money, time, and other efforts) each group spends i  galvanizing political influences. 
Becker (1983) solves the optimal amount of resources each group spends in producing 
political influence and finds that the political effectiveness of a group is determined by its 
relative efficiency in organizing pressures and controlling free-riding. 
 Another key finding of his model is that an increas  in deadweight costs reduces 
the equilibrium subsidy (S) (Proposition 2 in p. 381). Here, an increase in deadweight 
costs is represented by a decrease in F’  or an increase in G’. When it comes to IT 
investments, this finding implies that enhanced, streamlined processes in tax collection or 
subsidy payment resulting from the use of IT reduce deadweight costs associated with F 
and G and thus expand the size of subsidy. For instance, at the distribution side, some 
U.S. states such as California and Tennessee are using IT systems to reduce illegitimate 
Medicaid payments (Government Technology 2008). Software such as data mining and 
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analytic solutions is adopted in detecting fraudulent or unnecessary payment cases. At the 
tax collection side, Franklin County, Ohio, adopts address verification software to reduce 
the number of undelivered tax bills, collecting millions of unpaid taxes (Government 
Technology 2010). Therefore, the model of Becker (1983) provides a prediction that 
government IT investments lead to an expansion of government expenditures.  
 








Automated administrative processes improve the 
productivity of production of public goods and 
services. 
Negative 
Fiorina and Noll 
(1978), Banks (1989) 
Greater use of IT facilitates the monitoring role of 
legislatures. 
Negative Banks (1989) 
Demand-Side Explanation 
Citizens are more-informed via e-Governments 
initiatives and more engaged in monitoring 
administration.  
Negative 
Banks (1989), Banks 
and Weingast (1992) 
More efficient production of public goods 
increases the demand for the public goods. 
Positive 
Fiorina and Noll 
(1978), Becker (1983) 
 
4.2.4. The Relationship between IT Investments and Government Size 
 The discussions above have suggested mixed relationships between IT 
investments and government size, as summarized in Table 21. According to the model of 
Banks (1989), government size is negatively related to IT investments, while Becker 
(1983) illustrates a positive impact of IT. The model of Fiorina and Noll (1978) implies 
the presence of both effects. In sum, greater IT investments may enhance the productivity 
of public good production and make the monitoring activities of citizens and legislatures 
133  
 
less costly, leading to a smaller government. At the same time, enhanced efficiency and 
effectiveness of administrative processes imply that e price of public goods decreases, 
and thus the demand for public goods may become greater, as long as the price elasticity 
of public goods is positive. In a similar vein, Dunleavy et al. (2005) predict that in what 
they call the “digital-era governance,” government functions that have been privatized 
under the “new public management” doctrine for the last several decades will be 
reintegrated into the public sector organizations. This raises a possibility that IT 
investments are associated with a bigger government.  
Thus, rather than making a specific prediction, I offer the two competing 
hypotheses and try to investigate which effect prevails in the context of U.S. state 
governments. 
 
Hypothesis 1A: Greater IT investments made by governments are associated with 
smaller government expenditures. 
Hypothesis 1B: Greater IT investments made by governments are associated with bigger 
government expenditures. 
 
4.3. Empirical Methods 
  
I adopt the state government growth model proposed by Garand (1988, 1989) as a 
basis for my empirical analyses. Table 22 describes th  variables and data sources. The 
detailed description of some of the variables is avail ble in Appendix 4.1. 
My measure of government size is the ratio of state government expenditures to 









= ,     (21)  
where EXPENDt is state general expenditures in year t. State expenditure data were 
acquired from annual State Government Finance surveys published by the U.S. Census 
Bureau.  
 I acquired IT investments and IT organization information from the NASCIO 
Compendium of Digital Governments in States published in 2003 and 2005. IT intensity 
(Bharawaj et al. 1999, Anderson et al. 2006), the key independent variable, is measured 
in two ways – per capita budget of a central IT organization (IT1) and the ratio of the 
budget to state GDP (IT2). By a central IT organization, I mean a central IT office, 
division, or department which a state CIO directly oversees22. The NASCIO Compendium 
provides the IT budget figures in 193 state-years from 2001 to 2005. I find, however, that 
the State of Delaware reports unusually high figures of IT budgets (greater than 6σ above 
mean) for the fiscal years of 2003-2005. Considering these influential observations, I 
drop them in the estimations23. This results in a 5-year unbalanced panel with 190
observations from 44 states. Table 23 shows the list of states and the number of 
appearances in the dataset. t-tests do not reject the hypotheses that the states in he sample 
and those that are not do not differ significantly with respect to population, GDP, and 
total expenditures. 
 Garand (1988, 1989) lists several explanatory variables for state government size 
(Table 22). First, Wagner’s Law (Lybeck 1988, Gemmell 1993) suggests that government 
size is a function of industrialization, economic affluence and population growth. To 
                                                
22 The NASCIO Compendium also reports the IT budget figures of executive branches, but I do not include 
them as there are many missing figures for executive branch IT budgets. 
23 In estimation with including Delaware in the estimations, the coefficients of IT intensity are significant at 
the 10%-level of significance. 
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account for this effect, Garand chooses income and population as explanatory variables. 
The sign of these variables is expected to be positive. Second, the fiscal illusion 
hypothesis suggests that certain tax and finance syst ms may in effect hide the real costs 
of public good production. This leads taxpayers to underestimate the true prices and thus 
to demand more production of public goods than theywould if they are aware of the true 
prices. Such a tax system includes withholding provisi ns (personal income tax), indirect 
taxes (corporate income taxes), and complex tax systems. Also, a large level of debt 
service and intergovernmental grants from the federal government may also contribute to 
fiscal illusion (Grossman et al. 1999, Geys 2006). I control for five variables of tax and 
fiscal systems in the estimations as shown in Table 22. I expect that the sign of INDTAX, 
CORPTAX, DEBT, and FEDGRANT is positive, while that of COMPLEX is negative, 
as a high Herfindahl index indicates a simple tax system. 
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Table 22. Description of Variables 
Variable Description Theory Sources 
Dependent Variable 
GOVSIZEt State general expenditure divided by state gross dmestic 
product (GDP) (%)  
U.S. Census 
Bureau 
IT Intensity Variables 
IT1 Per capita IT budget of a central IT organization ($) NASCIO 
IT2 IT budget divided by state GDP (%) 
Control Variables 
GOVSIZEt-1 Lagged measure of government size U.S. Census 
Bureau 
 
INCOME State median household income 
($thousand) 
Wagner’s Law 
POPUL State total population (in millions) 
INDTAX Total state personal income taxes divided 
by total state revenue (%) 
Fiscal Illusion 
Hypothesis 
CORPTAX Total state corporate income taxes divided 
by total state revenue (%) 
COMPLEX Herfindahl index of revenue concentration  
DEBT Mean debt level per capita ($thousand) 
FEDGRANT Per capita federal intergovernmental-in-
aid ($thousand) 




LEGIS The sum of the proportion of Republican 
lawmakers in state senate and house of 
representatives 
PROGBUD 1 = state adopts program budgeting; 0 = 
otherwise 
NASBO 
INCBUD 1 = state adopts incremental 





Table 23. States in the Sample 
Region Division States 
Northeast 
New England 
Maine(4), New Hampshire(5), Vermont(3), 
Massachusetts(5), Rhode Island(5), Connecticut(3) 
Mid-Atlantic New York(5), Pennsylvania(2), New Jersy(3) 
Midwest 
East North Central Wisconsin(4), Michigan(5), Indiana(3), Ohio(5) 
West North Central 
Missouri(5), North Dakota(5), South Dakota(5), 
Kansas(5), Minnesota(5), Iowa(5) 
South 
South Atlantic 
Maryland(5), Virginia(3), West Virginia(2), North 
Carolina(5), South Carolina(3), Georgia(5), Florida(2) 
East South Central 
Kentucky(5), Tennessee(5), Mississippi(5), 
Alabama(5) 
West South Central Oklahoma(2), Texas(5), Arkansas(5) 
West 
Mountain 
Idaho(5), Montana(5), Wyoming(5), Nevada(5), 
Utah(5), Arizona(5), New Mexico(5) 
Pacific Washington(5), Oregon(3), California(3), Hawaii(5) 
The number in parentheses next to a state is the number of years that the state appears in the sample.  
Geographic region and division is from 2000 U.S. Census. 
 
Third, the party control explanation tells that “government growth is 
systematically related to control of governmental policy-making institutions by the liberal 
party within the state political system” (Garand 1988, p. 839). This suggests that a 
political control by the Democratic Party is related to greater growth of governments. I 
control for two variables that represent the political control in state governments and 
legislatures. Lastly, though not included in Garand (1988) model, budgeting processes 
may affect the size of government expenditure. According to the National Association of 
State Budget Officers (NASBO), two budgeting processes are most widely used – 
program budgeting and incremental budgeting (NASBO 2002). The former refers to a 
budgeting based on program goals and objectives, and the latter is based on incremental 
changes in budgets from previous fiscal years and appropriation trends. I include two 
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dummy variables for budgeting processes. I obtained state budgeting information from 
Budgeting Process in States published by NASBO. 
The following equations show the complete empirical model. 
 
GOVSIZEi,t = α + β1 GOVSIZEi,t-1 + β2 INCOMEi,t + β3 POPULi,t + β4 INDTAX i,t + β5 
CORPTAXi,t + β6 COMPLEXi,t + β7 DEBTi,t + β8 FEDGRANTi,t + β9 GOVERNORi,t + 
β10 LEGISi,t + β11 IT_INTENSITYi,t-2 + vi + εi,t     (22) 
 
where i and t represents a state, year, respectively, and IT_INTE SITY = IT1 or IT2. 
Also vi and εi,t are terms for state-specific unobserved heterogeneity and idiosyncratic 
errors, respectively. I choose a two-year lag of IT intensity measure, as the impact of IT 
investments is not likely to materialize immediately due to organizational learning and 
adjustment effects (Brynjolfsson 1993). However, I estimate the models with different 
lag lengths, and the main results do not change considerably. 





Table 24. Summary Statistics 
Variables Avg. Std. Dev. Min.  Max. 
GOVSIZE Government Size 11.4532 2.6126 6.7524 18.7217 
INCOME Income 46.5584 7.1084 32.6138 65.7097 
POPUL Population 5.7770 6.2498 0.4994 35.9903 
INDTAX Personal Tax 2.5173 1.6694 0 10.0801 
CORPTAX Corporate Tax 14.7870 8.8417 0 32.1842 
COMPLEX Tax Complexity 0.4160 0.1089 0.2260 0.7320 
DEBT Debt 2.3357 1.7655 0.0062 9.6415 
FEDGRANT Federal Grant 1.4389 0.4993 0.6866 4.0388 
GOVERNOR Governor 0.5421 0.4995 0 1 
LEGIS Legislature 0.9937 0.3229 0.2438 1.6143 
PROGBUD Program Budget 0.8316 0.3752 0 1 
INCBUD Inc. Budget 0.6842 0.4661 0 1 
IT1 Per capita IT budget 21.3060 19.0304 0.0438 92.8539 
IT2 
Ratio of IT budget 
to GDP 0.0495 0.0449 0.0001 0.2203 
Fiscal year 2003-2007 with a two-year lag of IT intensity (2001-2005). 
 
Table 25. Correlation Table 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (12) (13) (14) 
GOVSIZE (1) 1* 
INCOME (2) -0.3626*  1*
POPUL (3) -0.3666*  0.0663* 1*
INDTAX (4) -0.0802*  0.2405* 0.0752* 1*
CORPTAX (5) -0.0242*  0.2456* 0.1217* 0.2233* 1*
COMPLEX (6) -0.4388*  -0.0349* 0.1498* -0.4520* -0.4464* 1*
DEBT (7) 0.1410* 0.3298* -0.1339* 0.3834* 0.2420* -0.2136* 1*
FEDGRANT (8) 0.5498* -0.2902* -0.1948* -0.2481* -0.2620* -0.2394* 0.0630* 1*
GOVERNOR (9) 0.0110* 0.1322* 0.0129* -0.2063* 0.0073* 0.1560* 0.0498* -0.0669* 1*
LEGIS (10) -0.2309*  -0.1361* -0.0085* -0.0595* -0.2924* 0.0609* -0.3860* 0.0244* -0.1062* 1*
PROGBUD (12) -0.0042*  -0.0533* 0.0876* -0.0906* 0.1247* 0.0309* -0.0238* 0.0653* 0.1227* -0.0739* 1*
INCBUD (13) 0.2649* -0.1306* -0.1251* 0.1020* -0.2432* -0.1274* 0.0107* 0.3196* -0.0789* 0.0812* -0.0334* 1* *
IT1 (14) 0.0012* -0.1264* -0.2734* -0.1369* -0.1793* -0.0312* 0.0555* 0.3169* 0.0962* 0.2636* -0.0335* 0.1865* 1*
IT2 (15) 0.0784* -0.2181* -0.2829* -0.1330* -0.1711* -0.0620* 0.0126* 0.2804* 0.1227* 0.2393* -0.0352* 0.1849* 0.9792*




As government size may be affected by state-specific unobserved heterogenity 
(vi) that may be correlated with explanatory variables, one may estimate the above model 
with the fixed-effect estimation. However, the fixed- ffect estimation does not address 
the bias due to a correlation between vi and the lagged measure of government size 
(GOVSIZEt-1) (Kiviet 1995, Bond 2002). Hence, Eq. 22 has to be estimated by a dynamic 
panel data model (Roodman 2006). Specifically, I also adopt a two-step System 
Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) estimation outlined by Arellano and Bover 
(1995) and developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). I choose a System GMM approach 
over a Difference GMM model (Arellano and Bond 1991) because the former does not 
drop the first-year of observations. Therefore, a System GMM estimation increases a 
degree of freedom in the estimations24. Following the suggestion of Roodman (2006), I 
include year dummies in Eq. 22 to ensure that there is no autocorrelation between 
idiosyncratic disturbances. In addition, to address the issue of a large number of 
instruments, I follow Roodman (2009) by including only the first three lags of 




Table 26 presents the estimation results of Eq. 22 with the System GMM model. 
Column 1 shows the estimation without IT intensity variables. The coefficient of 
INCOME suggests that contrary to the theoretic prediction in Garand (1988), the higher 
median household income is, the smaller state governm nt expenditures become. This 
result can be explained by the theory of Meltzer and Richard (1981). Based on the 
                                                
24 In the following section, I show the result of the Difference GMM estimation. 
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median-voter theory, their theoretical model posits that as the ratio of mean income to 
median income increases, government spending expands s well. This is because a 
decisive voter with the median income demands more income redistribution as the voter’s 
income decreases. Meltzer and Richard (1983) provide empirical support to this 
proposition, and it appears that the estimation of this study does as well.  
Regarding fiscal illusion hypotheses, as expected, the coefficient of tax 
complexity (COMPLEX) is negative and statistically significant. Since a smaller 
Herfindahl index represents a more complex tax system, it appears that states with more 
complex tax systems demonstrate greater expenditure f gures. Column 1 shows that a 
large amount of federal grants (FGRANT) and debts (DEBT) accelerates the expansion 
of government expenditures, as predicted by fiscal illusion hypothesis. The party control 
hypothesis is partially supported. States with more Republican state legislators (LEGIS) 
are likely to have a smaller size of expenditures. 
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Table 26. Estimation Results 
Dependent Variable – GOVSIZE (State General Expenditures / State GDP) 
Model – Two-Step System GMM Estimation 




































































































Wald Statistics 36745.08***   12546.27***  12234.43***   
Hansen Test 3) 0.164***  0.152***  0.164***  
Serial Corr. Test 4) 0.383***  0.196***  0.194***  
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05 , ***p < 0.01; N=190; standard errors are in parentheses; year dummies are omitted  
Only the first three lags of GOVSIZE are used for instruments for GOVSIZEt-1. 
Fiscal year 2003-2007 with a two-year lag of IT intensity (2001-2005).; # of instrument variables = 34 
1) Per capita IT budget; 2) The ratio of IT budget to GDP;  
3) p-value. The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are exogenous.; 
4) p-value. Arellano-Bond test for AR(2). The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference 






The estimations with IT intensity variables in Table 26 show a negative 
relationship between IT intensity and state governme t size. The coefficients of two IT 
intensity variables are statistically significant at the 1% level in the System GMM 
estimations (Columns 2, 3). From the coefficient of IT1 in Column 2, I calculate that a $1 
increase in per capita IT budget is associated withan approximate $3.68 reduction in per 
capita general expenditures25. The coefficient of IT2 in Column 3 implies that if the 
proportion of IT budget to state GDP increases by one percentage point, the ratio of state 
expenditures to GDP decreases by approximately 3.49 percentage points. 
This result shows that greater IT investments are associated with smaller 
government expenditures, providing support to Hypothesis 1A. This finding suggests that 
in the context of U.S. state governments, the effect of improved productivity and 
effective bureaucracy control overwhelms the opposite effect of increasing demands for 
public services. To put it differently, the estimations with a two-year lag of IT intensity 
indicate that productivity improvement resulting from IT investments is realized in a 
relatively short period of time, but such improvement appears not to lead to an immediate 
increase in the demand for government services. When t  lag length is varied from no 
lag to a four-year lag in the estimations (Table 27), the coefficients of IT intensity (IT1) 
model are consistently negative at the 10% level of significance, offering further support 
to Hypothesis 1A. 
                                                
25 In the dataset, the average per capita state GDP in 2005 dollar is $39,202.56. $4 is derived from 
$39,202.56 × 0.000094  (the coefficient of IT1 in Table 24, Column 5) = $3.6850 
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Table 27. Estimation Results with Different Lag Lengths 
Dependent Variable – GOVSIZE (State General Expenditures / State GDP) 
Method – Two-Step System GMM Estimation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
























































































































































































































































































0.133***  0.138***  0.456***  0.403***  0.196***  0.194***  0.147***  0.135***  
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05 , ***p < 0.01; N = 190; standard errors are in parentheses; year dummies are omitted  
In System GMM estimation, only the first three lags are used for instruments; # of instruments = 34 
1) Per capita IT budget; 2) The ratio of IT budget to GDP 
3) p-value. The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are exogenous.; 
4) p-value. Arellano-Bond test for AR(2). The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference 
regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation. 
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Table 28. Estimation Results with Different Measures of Government Size 
Method – Two-Step System GMM Estimation 








Per State Employee 
(thousand $) 
The Ratio to GDP of 
Operation Expenses 
and Capital Outlays 
(%) 
Ratio to GDP of 



















































































































































































































































































0.164***  0.155***  0.125***  0.128***  0.217***  0.212***  0.037***  0.044***  
Serial 4) 
Corr. Test 
0.210***  0.211***  0.250***  0.254***  0.485***  0.455***  0.060***  0.056***  
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05 , ***p < 0.01; N = 190; standard errors are in parentheses; year dummies are omitted  
In System GMM estimation, only the first three lags are used for instruments. 
Fiscal year 2003-2007 with a two-year lag of IT intensity (2001-2005);  # of instrumental variables = 35 
1) Per capita IT budget; 2) The ratio of IT budget to GDP 
3) p-value. The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are exogenous.; 
4) p-value. Arellano-Bond test for AR(2). The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference 
regression exhibit no second-order serial correlation. 
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Following the approach of Levine et al. (2000), I conduct the specification tests 
for the dynamic panel data model. Hansen (1982) J test in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 26 
show that the null hypotheses of over-identifying rest ictions cannot be rejected with 16 
degrees of freedom, supporting the assumption that the instrumental variables used are 
exogenous. In addition, Arelleno and Bond (1991) tests do not reveal the presence of 
second-order correlations in differenced error terms. 
In order to check the robustness of the main result, I adopt alternative measures 
for state government size to estimate the effect of IT intensity. As Table 28 demonstrates, 
I use three different dependent variables for governm nt size –  per capita general 
expenditures, general expenditures per state employee, and the ratio to GDP of general 
expenditures net of current operation expenses and c pital outlays. Table 28 reveals that a 
higher IT intensity is associated with smaller per capita government expenditures 
(Column 1 and 2) as well as with smaller expenditures per state employee (Column 3 and 
4).  
In Column 5 and 6, I investigate the impact of IT intensity on the ratio of capital 
outlays and current operation expenses, which include wages and salaries (U.S. Census 






. The results show that more IT investments are associated with 
a smaller amount of capital outlays and operation expenses, which can be considered to 
be cost parts of government expenditures26. In addition, I estimate the effect of IT on 
non-cost parts of state government expenditures as hown in Column 7 and 8. The 
                                                
26 I also estimate the effects of IT intensity on capital outlays, current operation expenses, and wages 
individually, but the coefficients are insignificant. 
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measure accounts for subsidy and payments to welfare beneficiaries, intergovernmental 
grants to local governments, and contribution to employee pension systems. Column 7 
and 8 show that IT intensity is also negatively associated with the size of total 
expenditures net of current operation expenses and c pital outlays, suggesting that IT 
investments may reduce not only the cost components of expenditures but also the other 
components such as intergovernmental expenditures or direct subsidies27. 
The size of government expenditure may depend on other demographic and 
socioeconomic factors that are not accounted for in Eq. 22. Given that a major portion of 
state government expenditures are devoted to primary and secondary education and 
public welfare programs such as Medicaid, I include a ditional control variables such as 
the proportion of the elderly population, that of under 18, and poverty level. Including 
these variables does not change the main result significantly. In addition, some of the 
control variables may not be necessarily exogenous. For instance, state government 
employment or debt level may be influenced by the siz of expenditures, possibly causing 
a simultaneity bias. I re-estimated Eq. 22 with the System GMM assuming that DEBT is 
endogenous. The coefficients of IT intensity are still negative and statistically significant. 
I further conduct sensitivity analyses with alternative estimation and functional 
models. First, in lieu of the System GMM estimation (Blundell and Bond 1998), I 
estimate Eq. 22 with the Difference GMM (Arellano and Bond 1991). Column 1 of Table 
29 demonstrates that the coefficient of IT1 is negative and significant at the 5%-level. 
                                                
27 I further estimate the relationship between IT investments and expenditures on individual government 




Second, instead of regressing the government size measure on a lagged value of 
government size and control variables, I choose a ch nge in government size (the 
difference between government size in a focal year and in the previous year) as a 








i t i t
i t
i t i t
−
−
∆ = −   
= α + β2 INCOMEi,t + β3 POPULi,t + β4 INDTAX i,t + β5 CORPTAXi,t + β6 COMPLEXi,t  
+ β7 DEBTi,t + β8 FEDGRANTi,t + β9 GOVERNORi,t + β10 LEGISi,t  
+ β11 IT_INTENSITYi,t-2 + vi + εi,t       (23) 
 
As Eq. 23 does not contain a lagged value of the dependent variable in the RHS, I 
estimate Eq. 23 with the random-effects estimation. Columns 3 and 4 in Table 29 present 
the result, showing that the coefficient of IT intesity is still negative and statistically 
significant28. Third, I also employ a log-linear model for government size as shown in Eq. 
24. Here, GOVSIZE, DEBT, and FEDGRANT are the absolute amount of general 
expenditures, debts, and intergovernmental aids from the federal government, 
respectively, rather than the relative amount normalized by GDP or population. 
 
Log(GOVSIZE)i,t = α + β1 Log(GOVSIZE)i,t-1 + β2 Log(INCOME)i,t + β3 Log(POPUL)i,t 
+ β4 INDTAX i,t + β5 CORPTAXi,t + β6 COMPLEXi,t + β7 Log(DEBT)i,t  
+ β8 Log(FEDGRANT)i,t + β9 GOVERNORi,t + β10 LEGISi,t + β11 IT_INTENSITYi,t-2  




                                                
28 With fixed-effect estimations, the coefficient of IT intensity turns out to be insignificant (p>0.1), but a 
Hausman test does not reject the null hypothesis that the difference in coefficients between fixed- and 
random-effect estimations is not systematic. 
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Table 29. Estimation with Alternative Models 










Random Effects  Two-Step System GMM Estimation 



























































































































































































































































N 146***  146***  190***  190***  190***  190***  190***  190***  
Wald 
Statistics 









R2    0.4580***  0.4564***      
# of Instr. 
Variables 
29***  29***    34***  34***  46***  46***  
Hansen 
Test3) 
0.487***  0.380***    0.118***  0.127***  0.366***  0.370***  
Serial Cor 
Test 4) 
0.357***  0.480***    0.302***  0.278***  0.216***  0.219***  
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05 , ***p < 0.01; standard errors are in parentheses; year dummies are omitted  
In System and Difference GMM estimation, only the first three lags are used for instruments. 
Fiscal year 2003-2007 with a two-year lag of IT intensity (2001-2005).  
1) Per capita IT budget; 2) The ratio of IT budget to GDP 
3) p-value. The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are exogenous.; 
4) p-value. Arellano-Bond test for AR(2). The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first-difference 




The estimation of Eq. 24 with the two-step System GMM is shown in Columns 5 and 6. 
Here, the impact of IT intensity is still negative at the 1%-level of significance. 
 Lastly, one might argue that there is an endogeneity issue in the current 
estimations in that state total government expenditures and IT budgets are simultaneously 
affected by unaccounted state heterogeneity, rendering the estimations possibly biased 
and inconsistent. To address this concern, I re-estimate Eq. 22 with the two-step system 
GMM assuming that IT intensity is endogenous. Here, I mploy following instruments 
for IT intensity – IT governance and management variables29, the average IT intensity in 
neighboring states, and the average size of per capita private sector IT industry in 
neighboring states. I choose the average IT intensity in neighboring states as an 
instrument, since I expect that the IT policy in a st te is likely to be influenced by those 
in its neighboring states. Several prior studies in public economics theorize and 
empirically confirm ‘spillover effects’ in state expenditures, tax systems, and welfare 
policies (e.g. Case et al. 1993, Besley and Case 1995, Figlio et al. 1999, Baicker 2005)30. 
But, I do not expect that the IT intensity in the neighboring states has a significant impact 
on the total state expenditures. I also expect that the IT budget of a state government is 
related to the size of the private sector IT industry31. However, as it is likely that the 
bigger the IT industry in a state, the larger the state government expenditures are, I 
                                                
29 IT governance and management variables I adopt as instrumental variables include a dummy variable for 
whether a state legislative has an IT-related legislative committee; and a variable that measures the number 
of statewide IT management areas such as application rchitecture or security that a state central IT 
function directly manages. These variables are chosen based on the rationale that IT government and 
management affect the IT budget of the central IT function but is unlikely to be related to state government 
total expenditures. This information is available from NASCIO Compendium. 
30 For example, Figlio et al. (1999) find that states r pond to changes in both an increase and a decreas  in 
welfare benefits in neighboring states, an effect that they call ‘welfare competition.’ Baicker (2005) find 
that a dollar increase in spending in neighboring state  is associated with a 90-cent increase in the focal 
state. 
31 This information is available from Bureau of Economic Accounts. The IT industry measure is the amount 
of shipments in “computer and electronic product manuf cturing,” “information and data processing 
services,” and “computer systems design and related services.” 
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instead use the size of IT industry in neighboring states. I define ‘neighboring states’ as 
those that share geographic borders with a focal state. The correlation between per capita 
IT budget of a focal state and of neighboring state is 0.23.  
Column 7 and 8 of Table 29 demonstrate that the coeffi ient of IT1 is negative 
and statistically significant. Alternatively, I re-estimate Eq. 22 with regarding 
neighboring states as those that are in the same geographic division defined by U.S. 
Census Bureau as shown in Table 2332, and the result does not change substantially. Thus, 
the robustness analyses demonstrate that even when IT intensity is considered to be 
endogenous, IT intensity is still negatively associated with state expenditure size. 
Taken together, the empirical analyses confirm the theoretical argument that IT 
investments are associated with a productivity improvement in the production of public 
goods and a reduction in the monitoring cost incurred by legislatures and voters, resulting 




Motivated by the fact that government growth is a persistent, prevalent 
phenomenon in many industrialized nations (Saunders 1993), I investigate whether and 
how IT investments affect this trend. Based on the literature on public good production, 
bureaucracy, and public choices, I theorize the relationship between IT investments and 
government size.  
                                                
32 For instance, in Column 5 and 6 of Table 8, neighboring states of Pennsylvania are Delaware, Maryland, 




The empirical analysis confirms the hypothesis thatmore IT investments in state 
governments are associated with smaller government size. Estimations with the dynamic 
panel-data model provided by Blundell and Bond (1998) find a negative relationship 
between IT intensity and state government expenditures. Specifically, the result shows 
that a $1 increase in per capita IT budget is associated with an approximate $3.69 
reduction in per capita general expenditures. I also find that this result is robust to the use 
of different measures for government size such as per capita general expenditures or 
expenditures per employee (Table 28) as well as alterna ive functional models (Table 29). 
Not only is this study one of the first studies on IT investments in governments, 
but it contributes to the literature by proposing a new perspective in IT value studies. To 
the best of my knowledge, few studies, if any, have examined the performance effect of 
IT investments in the public sector. In addition, not only is this study one of the few 
studies that investigate the impact of IT on organiz tion size in the public sector, but it 
also identifies this impact with an organizational-level analysis, compared to industry-
level studies including Brynjolfsson et al. (1994) and Wood et al. (2008).  
The present study is not without limitations. First, on the theoretical side, the use 
of the theoretical models in Section 4.2 may not fully explain every aspect of government 
expenditures. I will further review the literature on government expenditures and attempt 
to build an integrative model that theorizes the eff ct of IT investments in government 
size. Second, on the empirical side, even though I consciously select control variables 
that may influence the size of state governments and an appropriate estimation technique, 
there must be other unaccounted factors in the estimations, which may cause the results 
to be biased or inconsistent. I will report further s nsitivity analyses in future works. 
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As this is one of the early studies on the IT value in the public sector, there are 
numerous opportunities for future research. The present study discovers that IT 
investments reduce the size of government expenditures, but it is unclear whether such a 
reduction comes from decreasing or deteriorating public services such as education or 
infrastructure. An unanswered question thus is whether IT assets in governments generate 
value by improving the quality of public services. Researchers may study the relationship 
between IT investments and such quality measures fo public services such as educational 
achievement, public safety, or healthcare quality. I expect that this study sparks interest 
on IT value in the public sector among IS scholars. 
This study measures a relatively short-term effect of IT spending on government 
expenditures, which turn out to be negative. Future studies may investigate a long-term 
effect on government size. It may be the case that in the long-run, an improvement in 
efficiency and productivity of government production that is driven by greater IT use 
indeed increases the demand for public services, as predicted in Section 4.2. It would 
therefore be interesting to investigate how the short-term and the long-term influence of 
IT investments differ in the public sector. 
Further, researchers may study the incentives of IT investments in governments. 
One might wonder why governments invest in IT in the apparent absence of profit-
seeking motivation and competitive pressures. As I find, IT investments lead to smaller 
government, an effect that is in contrast to bureaucrats' interests, according to the 
bureaucracy theory (Niskanen 1968, Miller and Joe 1983). Which factors motivate 




Appendix 4.1. Measures and Data Sources 
 
IT Intensity (IT1 and IT2) 
2002 NASCIO Compendium of Digital Governments in States provides the actual IT 
budget figure in fiscal year 2001 and 2002, and the expected budget in 2003. 2004-05 
Compendium covers the actual budget in 2003 and 2004, and the exp cted budget in 2005. 
I take the IT budgets in 2001 and 2002 from the 2002 Compendium and 2004 and 2005 
budgets from the 2004-05 compendium. For the IT budget in 2003, I first take the actual 
2003 budget from the 2004-05 Compendium. Second, if the actual 2003 budget is 
missing in the 2004-05 Compendium, I take the expected budget from the 2002 
Compendium. For example, New Hampshire does not reprt its 2003 IT budget in 2004-
05 Compendium. So I take its estimated 2003 budget from the 2002 Compendium. The 
correlation between the expected 2003 budget in the 2003 Compendium and the actual 
budget in 2004-05 Compendium is 0.66. 
IT1 is calculated by dividing IT budget by population estimate. IT2 is derived by dividing 
IT budget by state gross domestic product provided by Bureau of Economic Accounts. 
 
Tax Complexity (COMPLEX) 
I calculated a Herfindahl index of seven tax categories – personal income tax, corporate 
income tax, property tax, sales tax, license tax, severance tax on extraction of natural 
resources, and other taxes. Suppose that ti is he ratio of tax revenue in Category i to total 












Mean Debt Level (DEBT) 
From State Government Finances, I take an average of the beginning- and end-level of 
state debt and divide it by state population. 
 
Federal Grant (FEDGRANT) 
From State Government Finances, I take intergovernmntal revenue from federal 
government and divide it by state population. 
 
Party Control of Legislatures (LEGIS) 
I calculated the ratio of Republican state representatives in state house and Republican 
state senators in senate, respectively and added the two. Thus, LEGIS is between 0 and 2. 
For Nebraska, which has a unicameral legislature, I multiplied the ratio of republican by 
two. 
 
Program Budgeting (PRODBUD) and Incremental Budgeting (INCBUD) 
State budgeting process information is obtained from Budgeting Processes in the States 
published by the National Association of State Budget Officers in 2002 (page 45) and 
2008 (page 51). Budgeting information from 2002 version is coded for observations from 




Appendix 4.2. The Effect of IT on the Expected Budget Size in Banks (1989) Model 
 
Banks (1989) proves that the expected budget size ( , , )B c k v  increases in c (Page 
680) and k (Page 696, Corollary A2-1). Thus, a reduction in c or k will decrease the 
expected budget size. I prove here that the change in the legislature’s prior distribution of 
the cost (f) from IT investments increases k*, the upper boundary of k beyond which the 
legislature does not conduct an audit at all. 
k* is defined by 
*
0 0
( ) ( )
v v
k v c f c dc f c dc= − ⋅∫ ∫       (25) 









k v c f c dc= − ⋅∫ .        (26) 
 Suppose that F is a cumulative distribution function of c and t is the amount of IT 
investments. As more IT investments are made, the legislature can expect that the true 





. By integrating by parts, 
 
00 0 0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
v v vv
c f c dc c F c F c dc v F c dc⋅ = ⋅ − = −∫ ∫ ∫     (27) 
as ( ) 1F v =  and (0) 0F = . Therefore, 
















c f c dc⋅∫  indicates the expected value of c possessed by the legislature. IT 
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CHAPTER 5.  
CONCLUSION 
 
In this dissertation, I study whether and how information technologies improve 
organizational capabilities and generate value in the public sector organizations, an issue 
that the literature search in Chapter 1 discovers that prior studies have given scant 
attention. The three studies in Chapter 2, 3, and 4 delve into this subject with unique, but 
interrelated research questions and diverse theoretical bases. Drawing upon the public 
value management theory in the public administration literature, Chapter 2 proposes how 
IT resources facilitate the development of organization l capabilities, which in turn lead 
to greater public value. My review of public value management suggests that the four 
organizational capabilities are pivotal for greater public value – operational capability, 
communication capability, partnering capability, and i novative capability. These four 
capabilities moderate the relationship between IT resources and public value generation. 
Continuing the discussion in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 intends to empirically confirm whether 
IT investments are associated with greater operation l capability in U.S. state 
governments. Adopting a stochastic frontier estimation approach with a translog cost 
function, the empirical investigations demonstrate that larger IT investments in U.S. state 
governments are related with greater cost efficiency. Having found that IT investments 
are associated with cost reductions in state governm nt production, Chapter 4 is 
concerned with examining whether IT investments reduc  the amount of government 
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expenditures by slashing costs or raise it by increasing the demand for public goods 
produced by governments. Empirical analyses in Chapter 4 reveal that the former effect 
outweighs the latter in U.S. state governments. 
